Russia’s Nuclear Weapons: Doctrine, Forces, and Modernization

"Russia’s nuclear forces consist of both long-range, strategic systems—including intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs), and heavy bombers—and shorter- and medium-range delivery systems. Russia is modernizing its nuclear forces, replacing Soviet-era systems with new missiles, submarines and aircraft while developing new types of delivery systems. Although Russia’s number of nuclear weapons has declined sharply since the end of Cold War, it retains a stockpile of thousands of warheads, with more than 1,500 warheads deployed on missiles and bombers capable of reaching U.S. territory.

Doctrine and Deployment

During the Cold War, the Soviet Union valued nuclear weapons for both their political and military attributes. While Moscow pledged that it would not be the first to use nuclear weapons in a conflict, many analysts and scholars believed the Soviet Union integrated nuclear weapons into its warfighting plans. After the Cold War, Russia did not retain the Soviet “no first use” policy, and it has revised its nuclear doctrine several times to respond to concerns about its security environment and the capabilities of its conventional forces. When combined with military exercises and Russian officials’ public statements, this evolving doctrine seems to indicate that Russia has potentially placed a greater reliance on nuclear weapons and may threaten to use them during regional conflicts. This doctrine has led some U.S. analysts to conclude that Russia has adopted an “escalate to de-escalate” strategy, where it might threaten to use nuclear weapons if it were losing a conflict with a NATO member, in an effort to convince the United States and its NATO allies to withdraw from the conflict. Russian officials, along with some scholars and observers in the United States and Europe, dispute this interpretation; however, concerns about this doctrine have informed recommendations for changes in the U.S. nuclear posture.

Russia’s current modernization cycle for its nuclear forces began in the early 2000s and is likely to conclude in the 2020s. In addition, in March 2018, Russian President Vladimir Putin announced that Russia was developing new types of nuclear systems. While some see these weapons as a Russian attempt to achieve a measure of superiority over the United States, others note that they likely represent a Russian response to concerns about emerging U.S. missile defense capabilities. These new Russian systems include, among others, a heavy ICBM with the ability to carry multiple warheads, a hypersonic glide vehicle, an autonomous underwater vehicle, and a nuclear-powered cruise missile. The hypersonic glide vehicle, carried on an existing long-range ballistic missile, entered service in late 2019.

Arms Control Agreements

Over the years, the United States has signed bilateral arms control agreements with the Soviet Union and then Russia that have limited and reduced the number of warheads carried on their nuclear delivery systems. Early agreements did little to reduce the size of Soviet forces, as the Soviet Union developed and deployed missiles with multiple warheads. However, the 1991 Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty, combined with financial difficulties that slowed Russia’s nuclear modernization plans, sharply reduced the number of deployed warheads in the Russian force. The 2010 New START Treaty added modest reductions to this record but still served to limit the size of the Russian force and maintain the transparency afforded by the monitoring and verification provisions in the treaty.

Congressional Interest

Some Members of Congress have expressed growing concerns about the challenges Russia poses to the United States and its allies. In this context, Members of Congress may address a number of questions about Russian nuclear forces as they debate the U.S. nuclear force structure and plans for U.S. nuclear modernization. Congress may review debates about whether the U.S. modernization programs are needed to maintain the U.S. nuclear deterrent, or whether such programs may fuel an arms race with Russia. Congress may also assess whether Russia will be able to expand its forces in ways that threaten U.S. security if the United States and Russia do not continue to limit their forces under the New START Treaty. Finally, Congress may review the debates within the expert community about Russian nuclear doctrine when deciding whether the United States needs to develop new capabilities to deter Russian use of nuclear weapons..."
Russia's nuclear weapons 

Nonstrategic Nuclear Weapons

"Recent debates about U.S. nuclear weapons have questioned what role weapons with shorter ranges and lower yields can play in addressing emerging threats in Europe and Asia. These weapons, often referred to as nonstrategic nuclear weapons, have not been limited by past U.S.- Russian arms control agreements, although some analysts argue such limits would be of value, particularly in addressing Russia’s greater numbers of these types of weapons. Others have argued that the United States should expand its deployments of these weapons, in both Europe and Asia, to address new risks of war conducted under a nuclear shadow. The Trump Administration addressed these questions in the Nuclear Posture Review released in February 2018, and determined that the United States should acquire two new types of nonstrategic nuclear weapons: a new low-yield warhead for submarine-launched ballistic missiles and a new sealaunched cruise missile.

During the Cold War, the United States and Soviet Union both deployed nonstrategic nuclear weapons for use in the field during a conflict. While there are several ways to distinguish between strategic and nonstrategic nuclear weapons, most analysts consider nonstrategic weapons to be shorter-range delivery systems with lower-yield warheads that might be used to attack troops or facilities on the battlefield. They have included nuclear mines; artillery; short-, medium-, and long-range ballistic missiles; cruise missiles; and gravity bombs. In contrast with the longer-range “strategic” nuclear weapons, these weapons had a lower profile in policy debates and arms control negotiations, possibly because they did not pose a direct threat to the continental United States. At the end of the 1980s, each nation still had thousands of these weapons deployed with their troops in the field, aboard naval vessels, and on aircraft..."
Nonstrategic nuclear weapons

Legislation Limiting the President’s Power to Use Nuclear Weapons: Separation of Powers Implications

"Recent proposed legislation that would place limitations on the President’s power to employ nuclear weapons has prompted interest in questions related to the constitutional allocation of power over the United States’ nuclear arsenal. This memorandum examines the constitutional separation of powers principles implicated by legislative proposals that restrict the President’s authority to launch nuclear weapons.1
I. Recent Legislation and Proposals to Restrict First-Use of Nuclear Weapons
 Legislation proposed in the 115th Congress would limit the President’s ability to order a “first-use nuclear strike.”2 On January 24, 2017, identical versions of a bill titled the Restricting First-Use of Nuclear Weapons Act of 2017 (Restricting First-Use Bill) were introduced in both chambers of Congress. The Restricting First-Use Bill would prohibit the President from using the “Armed Forces of the United States to conduct a first-use nuclear strike unless such strike is conducted pursuant to a declaration of war by Congress that expressly authorizes such strike.”3 The term “first-use nuclear strike” is defined as an “attack using nuclear weapons against an enemy that is conducted without the President determining that the enemy has first launched a nuclear strike against the United States or an ally of the United States.”4 While some have advocated that the United States adopt a broader “no-first-use” policy and pledge never to use nuclear weapons first against a nuclear-armed adversary,5 the Restricting First-Use Bill would address the President’s ability to act as the sole decision maker when authorizing use of the nuclear arsenal. The Bill would not address overall U.S. policy on first-use, nor would it modify directly the technical mechanisms through which nuclear weapons are employed..."
President and nuclear weapons

Can Congress Limit the President's Power to Launch Nuclear Weapons?

"Recent legislation proposed in the 115th Congress intended to limit the President's ability to launch nuclear weapons has prompted heightened attention on Congress's constitutional power to control the nuclear arsenal. As outlined in earlier CRS products, the Constitution allocates the authorities necessary to conduct war and other military operations between Congress and the President. But the precise contours of each branch's respective powers have been the subject of debate since the founding era. Moreover, courts traditionally have been reluctant to resolve wartime separation of powers disputes between the legislative and executive branches, often dismissing these cases on jurisdictional grounds without reaching the merits of the constitutional challenges.

Against this backdrop of uncertainty, commentators have reached dramatically differing conclusions on the constitutionality of proposals to restrict the President's power over the nuclear arsenal. Proponents of congressional authority reason that Congress's many enumerated war powers—including the power to power "raise and support Armies" and "provide and maintain a Navy"—necessarily subsume a lesser authority to define how the President may utilize the forces and weapons that Congress has provided. But proponents of executive authority often argue that such restrictions would unconstitutionally infringe on the President's "commander in chief" power to make tactical decisions on how best to subdue an enemy..." 
President and nuclear weapons

Worldwide Threat Assessment of the US Intelligence Community

"Chairman McCain, Vice Chairman Reed, Members of the Committee, thank you for the invitation to offer the United States Intelligence Community’s 2016 assessment of threats to US national security. My statement reflects the collective insights of the Intelligence Community’s extraordinary men and women, whom I am privileged and honored to lead. We in the Intelligence Community are committed every day to provide the nuanced, multidisciplinary intelligence that policymakers, warfighters, and domestic law enforcement personnel need to protect American lives and America’s interests anywhere in the world..."
Threat assessment

Iran’s Nuclear Program: Tehran’s Compliance with International Obligations

"Several U.N. Security Council resolutions required Iran to cooperate fully with the International Atomic Energy Agency’s (IAEA’s) investigation of its nuclear activities, suspend its uranium enrichment program, suspend its construction of a heavy-water reactor and related projects, and ratify the Additional Protocol to its IAEA safeguards agreement. However, Tehran has implemented various restrictions on, and provided the IAEA with additional information about, its uranium enrichment program and heavy-water reactor program pursuant to the July 2015 Joint Cooperative Plan of Action (JCPOA), which Tehran concluded with China, France, Germany, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States. On the JCPOA’s Implementation Day, which took place on January 16, 2016, all of the previous resolutions’ requirements were terminated. The nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) and UN Security Council Resolution 2231, which the Council adopted on July 20, 2015, comprise the current legal framework governing Iran’s nuclear program. Iran has complied with the JCPOA and resolution..."
Iran's nuclear program

Pakistan’s Nuclear Weapons

"Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal probably consists of approximately 110-130 nuclear warheads, although it could have more. Islamabad is producing fissile material, adding to related production facilities, deploying additional nuclear weapons, and new types of delivery vehicles. Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal is widely regarded as designed to dissuade India from taking military action against Pakistan, but Islamabad’s expansion of its nuclear arsenal, development of new types of nuclear weapons, and adoption of a doctrine called “full spectrum deterrence” have led some observers to express concern about an increased risk of nuclear conflict between Pakistan and India, which also continues to expand its nuclear arsenal.

Pakistan has in recent years taken a number of steps to increase international confidence in the security of its nuclear arsenal. Moreover, Pakistani and U.S. officials argue that, since the 2004 revelations about a procurement network run by former Pakistani nuclear official A. Q. Khan, Islamabad has taken a number of steps to improve its nuclear security and to prevent further proliferation of nuclear-related technologies and materials. A number of important initiatives, such as strengthened export control laws, improved personnel security, and international nuclear security cooperation programs, have improved Pakistan’s nuclear security..."
Pakistan

U.S. Strategic Nuclear Forces: Background, Developments, and Issues

"Even though the United States plans to reduce the number of warheads deployed on its longrange missiles and bombers, consistent with the terms of the New START Treaty, it also plans to develop new delivery systems for deployment over the next 20-30 years. The 114th Congress will continue to review these programs, and the funding requested for them, during the annual authorization and appropriations process.

During the Cold War, the U.S. nuclear arsenal contained many types of delivery vehicles for nuclear weapons. The longer-range systems, which included long-range missiles based on U.S. territory, long-range missiles based on submarines, and heavy bombers that could threaten Soviet targets from their bases in the United States, are known as strategic nuclear delivery vehicles. At the end of the Cold War, in 1991, the United States deployed more than 10,000 warheads on these delivery vehicles. That number has declined to less than 1,600 warheads today, and is slated to decline to 1,550 warheads by 2018, after the New START Treaty completes implementation...:
Strategic nuclear forces

Procedures for Congressional Action in Relation to a Nuclear Agreement with Iran: In Brief

"An April 2015 framework for negotiations on a comprehensive nuclear agreement with Iran suggests that a final agreement that results in the easing of many existing sanctions on Iran might be reached. Amid concerns among some in Congress about the terms of the possible agreement, Congress passed, and the President signed, the Iran Nuclear Agreement Review Act of 2015 (P.L. 114-17).1 The act establishes a period for Congress to review any comprehensive agreement, during which certain presidential actions to provide relief from sanctions on Iran are barred. It also provides for congressional action during this period that could prevent (or allow) such relief. After this review period, further, the act requires the President to make certain certifications of Iran’s compliance with the agreement, and if these certifications are not made, it establishes expedited congressional procedures for legislation that could reinstate sanctions waived by the President..."
Iran

U.S. Strategic Nuclear Forces: Background, Developments, and Issues

"Even though the United States plans to reduce the number of warheads deployed on its long range missiles and bombers, consistent with the terms of the New START Treaty, it also plans to develop new delivery systems for deployment over the next 20-30 years. The 114th Congress will continue to review these programs, and the funding requested for them, during the annual authorization and appropriations process..."
Nuclear weapons

Nonstrategic Nuclear Weapons

"The FY2013 Defense Authorization Act (H.R. 4310, Section 1037) indicated that it is the sense of Congress that “the United States should pursue negotiations with the Russian Federation aimed at the reduction of Russian deployed and nondeployed nonstrategic nuclear forces.” The United States and Russia have not included limits on these weapons in past arms control agreements. Nevertheless, some analysts and Members of Congress have argued that disparities in the numbers of nonstrategic nuclear weapons may become more important as the United States and Russia reduce their numbers of deployed long-range, strategic nuclear weapons..."

Nuclear weapons

Projected Costs of U.S. Nuclear Forces, 2015 to 2024

"Nuclear weapons have been a cornerstone of U.S. national security since they were developed during World War II. During the Cold War, nuclear forces were central to U.S. defense policy, resulting in the buildup of a large arsenal. Since that time, they have figured less prominently than

conventional forces, and the United States has not built any new nuclear weapons or delivery systems for many year..."

Nuclear forces cost

U.S. Nuclear Weapon “Pit” Production Options for Congress

"A “pit” is the plutonium core of a nuclear weapon. Until 1989, the Rocky Flats Plant (CO) mass-

produced pits. Since then, the United States has made at most 11 pits per year (ppy). U.S. policy

is to maintain existing nuclear weapons. To do this, the Department of Defense states that it needs

the Department of Energy (DOE), which maintains U.S. nuclear weapons, to produce 50-80 ppy

by 2030. While some argue that few if any new pits are needed, at least for decades, this report

focuses on options to reach 80 ppy..."

U.S. Nuclear weapons

North Korea’s Nuclear Weapons: Technical Issues

"This report summarizes what is known from open sources about the North Korean nuclear
weapons program—including weapons-usable fissile material and warhead estimates—and
assesses current developments in achieving denuclearization..."
North Korea's Nuclear Weapons

North Korea’s Nuclear Weapons: Technical Issues

"This report summarizes what is known from open sources about the North Korean nuclear weapons program—including weapons-usable fissile material and warhead estimates—and assesses current developments in achieving denuclearization. Little detailed open-source information is available about the DPRK’s nuclear weapons production capabilities, warhead sophistication, the scope and success of its uranium enrichment program, or extent of its proliferation activities. In total, it is estimated that North Korea has between 30 and 50 kilograms of separated plutonium, enough for at least half a dozen nuclear weapons..."
North Korea's Nuclear Weapons: Technical Issues

2010 Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) Review Conference: Key Issues and Implications
"The nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), which entered into force in 1970 and was extended
indefinitely in 1995, is the centerpiece of international nuclear nonproliferation efforts.
The NPT recognizes five nations (the United States, Russia, France, Britain, and China) as
nuclear-weapon states; 189 countries are parties to the NPT. India, Israel, and Pakistan have
never signed the treaty and possess nuclear weapons. North Korea acceded to the NPT but
announced its withdrawal in 2003. Several countries, including Argentina, Brazil, and South
Africa, ended their nuclear weapons programs and joined the NPT in the 1990s. Others—Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan—gave up former Soviet nuclear weapons on their territories and joined
the NPT as non-nuclear-weapon states in the 1990s. Iraq had a nuclear weapons program prior
to the 1991 Persian Gulf War. UN inspectors subsequently oversaw the program’s dismantlement,
and Iraq is now in full compliance with the NPT. Libya gave up a clandestine nuclear weapons
program after a 2003 agreement. Iran was found in noncompliance with its International Atomic
Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards obligations in 2005, and the matter was referred to the UN
Security Council. The IAEA has reported that Syria has not fully cooperated with an
investigation into its nuclear activities..."

The Global Nuclear Detection Architecture: Issues for Congress
"In 2005, the Domestic Nuclear Detection Office (DNDO) was established within
the Department of Homeland Security to centralize coordination of the federal
response to an unconventional nuclear threat. The office was codified in 2006
through the passage of the SAFE Port Act (P.L. 109-347) and given specific statutory
responsibilities to protect the United States against radiological and nuclear attack, including the responsibility to develop a “global nuclear detection architecture.” Determining the range of existing federal efforts protecting against nuclear attack, coordinating the outcomes of these efforts, identifying overlaps and gaps between them, and integrating the results into a single architecture are likely to be evolving, ongoing tasks..."