Possible U.S. Policy Approaches to North Korea

"Since assuming office, the Trump Administration has raised the North Korea threat to a top-level foreign policy priority in response to the regime’s demonstrations of rapid military advances. Officially called the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK), North Korea has rebuffed U.S. and South Korean offers to negotiate on denuclearization since 2009 and has continued to develop its nuclear and ballistic missile programs. In 2017, North Korea conducted its sixth and most powerful nuclear weapons test, and carried out two tests of long-range ballistic missiles that some observers believe have intercontinental range. All of these tests violate United Nations Security Council (UNSC) resolutions.

North Korea is on track to develop and deploy the capability to attack the U.S. homeland with nuclear-armed intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs). U.S. intelligence estimates note that North Korea already likely has the capability to mount nuclear warheads on mediumrange ballistic missiles that can reach Japan and Guam, both of which have major U.S. military installations. Official statements by the Kim Jong-un government suggest it is striving to build a credible regional nuclear warfighting capability that could evade regional missile defenses. (See CRS In Focus IF10472, North Korea’s Nuclear and Ballistic Missile Programs.)..."
U.S. and North Korea

Nuclear Negotiations with North Korea: In Brief

"Some analysts have suggested that, in response to the accelerated pace of North Korea’s nuclear and missile testing programs and its continued threats against the United States and U.S. allies, the United States might engage in an aggressive negotiation strategy. Since the early 1990s, successive U.S. Presidents have faced the question of whether to negotiate with the North Korean government to halt Pyongyang’s nuclear program and ambitions. Questions for policymakers include the utility, timing, scope, and goals of diplomatic talks with Pyongyang.

The United States has engaged in four major sets of formal nuclear and missile negotiations with North Korea: the bilateral Agreed Framework (1994-2002), the bilateral missile negotiations (1996-2000), the multilateral Six-Party Talks (2003-2009), and the bilateral Leap Day Deal (2012). In general, the formula for these negotiations has been for North Korea to halt, and in some cases disable, its nuclear or missile programs in return for economic and diplomatic incentives. While some of the negotiations have shown progress, North Korea has continued to advance its nuclear and missile programs.."
North Korea nuclear negotiations

The North Korean Nuclear Challenge: Military Options and Issues for Congress

"North Korea’s apparently successful July 2017 tests of its intercontinental ballistic missile capabilities, along with the possibility that North Korea (DPRK) may have successfully miniaturized a nuclear warhead, have led analysts and policymakers to conclude that the window for preventing the DPRK from acquiring a nuclear missile capable of reaching the United States is closing. These events appear to have fundamentally altered U.S. perceptions of the threat the Kim Jong-un regime poses to the continental United States and the international community, and escalated the standoff on the Korean Peninsula to levels that have arguably not been seen since 1994.

A key issue is whether or not the United States could manage and deter a nuclear-armed North Korea if it were to become capable of attacking targets in the U.S. homeland, and whether taking decisive military action to prevent the emergence of such a DPRK capability might be necessary. Either choice would bring with it considerable risk for the United States, its allies, regional stability, and global order. Trump Administration officials have stated that “all options are on the table,” to include the use of military force to “denuclearize,”—generally interpreted to mean eliminating nuclear weapons and related capabilities—from that area..."
North Korea and nuclear challenge

North Korea’s Nuclear Weapons: Technical Issues

"This report summarizes what is known from open sources about the North Korean nuclear
weapons program—including weapons-usable fissile material and warhead estimates—and
assesses current developments in achieving denuclearization..."
North Korea's Nuclear Weapons

North Korea’s Nuclear Weapons: Technical Issues

"This report summarizes what is known from open sources about the North Korean nuclear weapons program—including weapons-usable fissile material and warhead estimates—and assesses current developments in achieving denuclearization. Little detailed open-source information is available about the DPRK’s nuclear weapons production capabilities, warhead sophistication, the scope and success of its uranium enrichment program, or extent of its proliferation activities. In total, it is estimated that North Korea has between 30 and 50 kilograms of separated plutonium, enough for at least half a dozen nuclear weapons..."
North Korea's Nuclear Weapons: Technical Issues

North Korea’s 2009 Nuclear Test: Containment, Monitoring, Implication
"On May 25, 2009, North Korea announced that it had conducted its second underground nuclear
test. Unlike its first test, in 2006, there is no public record that the second one released radioactive materials indicative of a nuclear explosion. How could North Korea have contained these
materials from the May 2009 event and what are the implications?

As background, the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) would ban all nuclear
explosions. It was opened for signature in 1996. Entry into force requires ratification by 44 states
specified in the treaty, including the United States and North Korea. As of November 2010, 153
states, including 35 of the 44, had ratified. North Korea has not signed the CTBT. President
Clinton signed it in 1996; in 1999, the Senate voted not to consent to its ratification. In 2009,
President Obama pledged to press for its ratification..."

North Korea’s 2009 Nuclear Test: Containment, Monitoring, Implications
"On May 25, 2009, North Korea announced that it had conducted its second underground nuclear
test. Unlike its first test, in 2006, there is no public record that the second one released radioactive materials indicative of a nuclear explosion. How could North Korea have contained these materials from the May 2009 event and what are the implications?

As background, the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) would ban all nuclear
explosions. It was opened for signature in 1996. Entry into force requires ratification by 44 states specified in the treaty, including the United States and North Korea. As of April 2010, 151 states, including 35 of the 44, had ratified. North Korea has not signed the CTBT. President Clinton signed it in 1996; in 1999, the Senate voted not to consent to its ratification. In 2009, President Obama pledged to press for its ratification.

The treaty establishes a verification mechanism, including an International Monitoring System
(IMS) to detect nuclear tests. Three IMS technologies detect waves that pass through the oceans
(hydroacoustic), Earth (seismic), or atmosphere (infrasound); a fourth detects radioactive material from a nuclear test. Scientists concur that only the latter proves that an explosion was nuclear.Some believe that deep burial and other means can contain radioactive effluents. Another view is that containment is an art as much as a science. The United States learned to improve containment over several decades. Yet by one estimate, North Korea contained over 99.9% of the radioactive effluents from its 2009 test. It might have done so by application of lessons learned from its 2006 test or the U.S. nuclear test experience, use of a higher-yield device, release of material below the detection threshold, good luck, or some combination. Alternatively, the 2009 event may have been a nonnuclear explosion designed to simulate a nuclear test