2024 Presidential Nominating Process: Frequently Asked Questions

"The presidential nominating process is one of the most complex aspects of American politics. This report provides brief answers to selected frequently asked questions about that process in 2024. In some cases, the topics addressed herein are developing rapidly and are subject to change..

Both major parties select their presidential and vice-presidential nominees every four years through an extended process that can involve caucuses, conventions, primary elections, or a combination thereof. Each party establishes its own rules about how nominees are selected and how state parties may participate in that process, culminating in the quadrennial national nominating conventions. These meetings are important occasions in the nation’s political life and traditionally mark the end of the nomination phase of the presidential campaign season for their respective parties. For 2024, the Democratic Convention is scheduled for August 19-22 in Chicago, IL. The Republican Convention is scheduled for July 15-18 in Milwaukee, WI.

Democrats and Republicans use different methods to select their delegates within states and to allocate their votes at the national conventions. These include a combination of delegates who are pledged to particular candidates and selected at state nominating events, as well as those who are automatic delegates by virtue of their party positions. Both parties may penalize states that do not adhere to party rules surrounding delegate selection and allocation.

Both major parties award delegates based at least partially on a state’s previous support for the party’s presidential nominees. For 2024, Democrats expected to allocate a total of 4,521 delegates, and Republicans expected to allocate a total of 2,429 delegates.

The presidential nominating process is a political one, not a governmental one. Political parties are private entities and are generally free to set their own rules for how they select presidential and vice-presidential nominees. Federal or state election laws set some boundaries, particularly those guaranteeing fundamental voting-rights protections (e.g., through the Voting Rights Act). Federal campaign finance law also regulates all aspects of fundraising and spending affecting presidential campaigns, including during the nomination phase.

Congress does not have formal institutional roles in the presidential nominating process, which is governed by political parties. Congress typically does not legislate on the nomination process itself. Individual Members of Congress can and often do choose to be actively involved, in their unofficial capacities, in presidential campaigns and to attend presidential nominating conventions as delegates. Policy matters related to the nominating process could arise as part of the House and Senate’s elections oversight or appropriations duties, such as through providing funding for convention security or considering of federal election legislation.

This report provides general policy information about the nomination process. It does not provide detailed discussion of party rules, which the parties alone interpret and enforce. Members of Congress or staff members who are participating in the nominating process or serving as convention delegates often consult with their state or national party committees regarding their individual roles and responsibilities, and interpretation of party rules..."
Presidential Nominating Process 

Legal Definitions: A Research Guide for Congressional Staff

"This report is designed to introduce congressional staff to examples of legal and nonlegal sources, including statutes, legislation, and dictionaries, for researching legal definitions. It includes governmental sources, such as the United States Code (U.S. Code), the Code of Federal Regulations (C.F.R.), and congressional legislation. Proprietary information sources are also included..."
Legal Definitions 

Abolishing a Federal Agency: The Interstate Commerce Commission

"Congress has, from time to time, enacted legislation to discontinue a federal agency and either redistribute or discontinue its functions. Abolishment of an agency or its functions has often been politically challenging because of the potential impact on stakeholders with competing interests. Frequently, it has also been administratively complex, involving myriad decisions about policies and the distribution of functions and resources during the winding down of the abolished agency.

This report takes a closer look at the abolishment of one particular agency—the Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC)— and most of its functions. It reviews, in historical context, the ICC’s establishment, growth, decline, and elimination.

During the mid-1800s, railroads became key for rural growers, mining companies, and others to transport goods to urban centers. The nature of rail transportation and national and state government policies led to powerful railroad companies that were monopolistic in some geographic areas and ruinously hypercompetitive in others. Responding to public opinion and stakeholder advocacy, Congress established the ICC to defend the public from these practices, primarily through adjudication of grievances.

Although some considered the newly established ICC to be relatively weak and ineffective, Congress greatly expanded the ICC’s authority and responsibilities during the first part of the 20th century. World War I led the federal government to take control of the railroads. Following the war, the railroads were returned to private control. Rather than returning to its pre-war role as a regulator of privately owned and operated railroads, however, the ICC was charged with broader responsibilities in managing the industry in the context of U.S. commerce. The railroad industry was weakened by the Great Depression and increasing competition from other transportation modes—particularly trucking. These challenges led Congress to further adjust the ICC’s role from protecting those  served by powerful railroad companies to managing the economics of the transportation sector in the public interest..."
Abolish a Federal Agency

Disqualification of a Candidate for the Presidency, Part II: Examining Section 3 of the Fourteenth Amendment as It Applies to Ballot Access

"Numerous lawsuits across the country have sought or are seeking to prevent former President Donald Trump from appearing on state ballots for the upcoming presidential elections. In particular, these suits, filed in both state and federal courts, are requesting that various secretaries of state exclude the former President from the states’ ballots for the upcoming presidential primary and general elections. Plaintiffs allege that Trump’s efforts to impede the congressional certification of the 2020 electoral college vote by, among other things, urging his supporters to march to the U.S. Capitol on January 6, 2021, amount to “engag[ing] in insurrection” within the meaning of Section 3 of the Fourteenth Amendment. Plaintiffs contend that the former President is therefore disqualified as a candidate for the presidency. Many of the lawsuits challenging Trump’s ability to be placed on state ballots have been dismissed by courts on jurisdictional grounds without reaching the merits of the constitutional claims.

On December 19, 2023, the Colorado Supreme Court became the first court to hold that former President Trump is ineligible to appear on the ballot because he is constitutionally disqualified from holding the office of the President, and the court directed the Colorado secretary of state to exclude the former President’s name from the state’s 2024 presidential primary ballot. That decision has been stayed until January 4, potentially enabling Trump the opportunity to appeal the decision to the U.S. Supreme Court before it goes into effect. (As of the date of this Sidebar, the Colorado Republican State Central Committee has reportedlyfiled a petition of certiorari with the U.S. Supreme Court challenging the state court ruling.)

This Legal Sidebar is Part 2 in a two-part series examining how Section 3 of the Fourteenth Amendment applies to ballot access by a presidential candidate. It discusses the eligibility requirements for a candidate to be placed on the ballot for the presidency and the application of Section 3 to the 2024 presidential elections. Part 1 focuses on the meaning of Section 3 as it applies to the presidency, including a discussion of the recent case disqualifying Trump from the ballot in Colorado, Anderson v. Griswold. For further background on Section 3, including whether it requires implementing legislation from Congress to take effect, see this Legal Sidebar and this Legal Sidebar.."
Presidency disqualification 

Access to Government Information: An Overview

"Congress has long recognized the people’s right to know about the operations and actions of the federal government. A series of modern statutes provides a framework for ways the public may access government information. Built up over the past 60 years, these key statutes allow the public to access information about the federal government’s operations, information the government might collect on individuals, and insight into some of the government’s decisionmaking processes.

These key statutes include the
• Freedom of Information Act (FOIA; 5 U.S.C. §552),
• Privacy Act of 1974 (Privacy Act; 5 U.S.C. §552a),
• Government in the Sunshine Act (Sunshine Act; 5 U.S.C. §552b), and
• Federal Advisory Committee Act (FACA; 5 U.S.C. Chapter 10).

These statutes generally operate by using one or two access mechanisms: a request-based system for information, and proactive or contemporaneous disclosure of the information in an open forum. Each method has its benefits and drawbacks for individuals seeking to gain information from federal government actors. Implementation and understanding of these statutes and corresponding policies have changed over time.

After enactment of these statutes and subsequent evolution in their implementation, Congress has continued to question whether they provide for sufficient public inspection of government activity and whether federal government actors are complying with or circumventing the intent of these statutes. To help determine whether or not information can be sufficiently accessed, Congress might evaluate multiple questions, including whether the sought-after information is exclusive to certain individuals or software, at what point the information can be retrieved during decisionmaking processes, and if the information provided is sufficient to determine the context in which it was created. This report provides an overview of each of the four statutes and includes a discussion of policy questions and legislative considerations for each one..."
Government Information

Archival Records of Congress: Frequently Asked Questions

"Congressional offices and committees receive, generate, and process many paper and digital files in the course of their work. Archivists preserve some of this historical material, which can help inform future Congresses and researchers studying congressional history. This report is intended to assist congressional staffers who want to locate and access these historical materials.

Recordkeeping rules, policies, and practices vary by type of congressional office. Materials in a Member’s office are traditionally considered the Member’s personal property. Although some Members choose to donate their papers to an archival repository after they leave office, there is no legal requirement for Members to preserve papers or make them available to researchers. The Biographical Directory of the United States Congress, among other resources, can help users locate Member papers and other relevant archival collections.

Files from congressional committees and House or Senate administrative offices may be official records. House Rule VII and Senate Rule XI govern records for the House and Senate, respectively. In accordance with 44 U.S.C. §2118, the Clerk of the House and Secretary of the Senate transfer noncurrent House and Senate records to the National Archives and Records Administration (NARA) at the end of each Congress. Although NARA’s Center for Legislative Archives is responsible for preserving those files, they remain the property of Congress.

In general, House records are closed to the public for 30 years, and Senate records are closed for 20 years. Some sensitive congressional records may remain closed for 50 years. In some circumstances, however, Members and congressional staff may be able to access otherwise-restricted records. The House archivist or Senate archivist, respectively, offer guidance and assistance with access to archival records, as well as managing active records and papers.

NARA also stores other legislative-branch records, as well as pre-1789 legislative records. Separately, both NARA and the Library of Congress operate programs to capture and preserve public-facing congressional websites..."
C ongressional Archival Records 

Israel and Hamas October 2023 Conflict: Frequently Asked Questions (FAQs)

"On October 7, 2023, the Palestinian Sunni Islamist group Hamas (a U.S.-designated foreign terrorist organization, or FTO) led surprise attacks against Israel from the Gaza Strip by land, sea, and air. The assault came on a Jewish holiday, 50 years after the Egypt-Syria surprise attack that sparked the 1973 Yom Kippur War. The attacks’ scope and lethality against Israel have no precedent in the 16 years Hamas has controlled Gaza, and the nature of the violence stunned Israelis. The apparent intelligence and operational failures in preventing the assault will be a subject of analysis for Israeli and U.S. officials. Iran reportedly provides material support to Hamas, and according to U.S. officials may be complicit in a broad sense, but President Biden has said “there is no evidence” that Iran helped plan the attack.

In response to the attacks, Israel’s cabinet formally declared war on Hamas. Israel has initiated efforts to recover hostages, begun an aerial bombardment campaign against militants in Gaza, mobilized hundreds of thousands of reserve troops, and repositioned ground forces close to Gaza. Israel’s government almost completely halted the supply of electricity, food, water, and fuel to Gaza, which before the conflict had already faced crisis-level economic and humanitarian conditions.

Israeli officials have said that they aim to change the status quo in Gaza, and are contemplating a major ground invasion that may seek to end Hamas’s rule there. The Israel Defense Forces has said it “calls for” all civilians residing in northern Gaza to evacuate southward. Hamas called on people to remain in place. United Nations Secretary-General António Guterres has expressed concern for the effects Israeli actions regarding Gaza may have on civilian well-being. An estimated 1 million Gazans (nearly half the territory’s population) have been displaced from their homes.

On October 16, Secretary of State Antony Blinken announced that the United States and Israel have agreed to develop a plan that will enable international humanitarian aid to reach civilians in Gaza. On October 18 during a visit to Israel, President Biden confirmed this plan and announced $100 million in U.S. humanitarian assistance for Palestinians in Gaza and the West Bank..."
Israel and Hamas 

Israel and Hamas October 2023 Conflict: Frequently Asked Questions (FAQs)

"On October 7, 2023, Gaza Strip-based militants led by the Palestinian Sunni Islamist group Hamas (a U.S.-designated foreign terrorist organization, or FTO) engaged in a series of surprise attacks by land, sea, and air against Israel. The assault targeted Israeli military bases and civilian areas during the final Jewish high holiday, just over 50 years after the Egypt-Syria surprise attack that sparked the 1973 Yom Kippur War. Hamas reportedly receives much of its funding, weapons, and training from Iran. The Biden Administration has stated publicly that it does not have evidence that the Iranian government had a planning role. National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan has described Iran as “complicit in this attack in a broad sense” given the level of support it has provided Hamas for years. The attacks’ scope and lethality against Israel have no precedent in the 16 years Hamas has controlled Gaza. The nature of the violence stunned Israelis; apparent intelligence and operational failures in preventing the assault surprised Israeli, U.S., and other Western officials.
 

In response, Israel’s cabinet formally declared war on Hamas, with Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu asserting that Israel will win a long and difficult campaign. As it seeks to keep militants out of Israeli territory, target them in densely populated Gaza, and recover hostages, the Israeli government has halted the supply of electricity, food, water, and fuel to Gaza. Israeli officials have said that fundamental changes to the status quo are necessary to reestablish security for Israel, but have not specified whether they intend to attempt to end Hamas’s rule in Gaza. Following the attacks, Israel has initiated an aerial bombardment campaign in Gaza, mobilized hundreds of thousands of reserve troops, and repositioned ground forces close to Gaza. On October 13, the Israel Defense Forces called for the evacuation of all civilians in Gaza City “from their homes southward for their own safety and protection.” Hamas called on people to remain in place. U.N. officials expressed concern about potentially grave humanitarian consequences.
 

On October 11, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu formed an emergency unity government that has brought former Defense Minister Benny Gantz into the existing coalition, supposedly for the duration of the war in Gaza. Netanyahu, Gantz, and current Defense Minister Yoav Gallant are to comprise a cabinet to manage war-related efforts, and have agreed that no unrelated legislation or government resolutions—including on Israel’s judicial system—will be advanced during that time. .."Israel and Hamas   

Israel and Hamas: Major Conflict After Surprise Attacks

"Overview

On October 7, 2023, Gaza Strip-based militants led by the Palestinian Sunni Islamist group Hamas (a U.S.-designated foreign terrorist organization, or FTO) engaged in a series of surprise attacks by land, sea, and air against Israel (see Figure 1). The assault targeted Israeli military bases and civilian areas during the final Jewish high holiday, almost exactly 50 years after the Egypt-Syria surprise attack that sparked the 1973 Yom Kippur War. The Biden Administration and Israel have stated publicly that they do not have evidence that the Iranian government had a planning role, but are looking at the question. Some figures from Hamas and the Iran-backed Shia Islamist group Lebanese Hezbollah (also an FTO) haveclaimed that Hamas received support for the attacks from Iran, though a senior Hamas official has denied an Iranian planning role. Iranian officials have praised the assault publicly. The attacks’scope and lethality against Israel have no precedent in the 16 years Hamas has controlled Gaza. The nature of the violence stunned Israelis; apparent intelligence and operational failures in preventing the assault surprised Israeli, U.S., and other Western officials..."
Israel and Hamas 

Modeling the Demand for Electric Vehicles and the Supply of Charging Stations in the United States: Working Paper 2023-06

"This paper presents a simulation model of the markets for light-duty electric vehicles (EVs) and the associated public charging infrastructure, as well as the network interactions between them. It illustrates the model’s attributes by simulating the effects of federal subsidies for public electric vehicle chargers and of an extension of tax credits for electric vehicles. I project that by the early 2030s the charger subsidies, which were signed into law in 2021 as part of the Infrastructure Investment and Jobs Act, will have increased the size of the charger network enough to meet the demand for charging through the middle of that decade. That includes the additional demand that the expansion itself will induce: I project that through 2030, sales of EVs will rise more than 20 percent more rapidly with the expanded charger network than they would have otherwise. Including the additional effect of the EV tax credits that were signed into law as part of the 2022 reconciliation act, as well as past growth in EV sales, I project that EVs will constitute between 27 percent and 60 percent of new light-duty vehicle sales by 2032, compared with about 6.5 percent in 2022. After the subsidy funding from the Infrastructure Investment and Jobs Act has been spent and the available EV tax credits claimed, EV charger networks and the EV fleet will remain somewhat larger than they would have been in the absence of those policies.."
Electirc Vehicles 

Tracking Federal Awards: USAspending.gov and Other Data Sources

"USAspending.gov, available at http://www.USAspending.gov, is a government source for data on federal awards by state, congressional district (CD), county, city, and zip code. The awards data in USAspending.gov are provided by federal agencies and represent contracts, grants, loans, and other forms of financial assistance. USAspending.gov also provides tools for examining the broader picture of federal spending obligations within the categories of budget function, agency, and object class.

Using USAspending.gov to locate and compile accurate data on federal awards can be challenging due, in part, to continuing data quality issues that have been identified by the U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO). Users of USAspending.gov need to be aware that while search results may be useful for informing consideration of certain questions, these results may be incomplete or contain inaccuracies.

USAspending.gov was created under P.L. 109-282, the Federal Funding Accountability and Transparency Act of 2006 (FFATA), and later enhanced under requirements in P.L. 113-101, the Digital Accountability and Transparency Act of 2014 (DATA Act).
 

Other federal awards data sources reviewed in this report include the following:
• Federal Procurement Data System (FPDS);
• Census Federal Audit Clearinghouse;
• U.S. Budget: Aid to State and Local Governments;
• Rockefeller Institute of Government;
• Federal Funds Information for States;
• Census Federal Aid to States (FAS) and Consolidated Federal Funds Report (CFFR); and
• Additional federal grant awards databases, including sources tracking medical, scientific, and technical research.."
Federal awards and spending 

The U.S. “Housing Recession”

"Economists often look to the housing market as an indicator of the health of the economy. As the COVID19 pandemic accelerated, the housing market was relatively strong, characterized by robust demand, rising prices, and increased construction. Since the latter half of 2021, spending on residential construction has faltered, leading some to believe that the United States is or was in a “housing recession.” Some have speculated that lower spending in the housing sector is a sign that overall spending in the economy will decrease and that a housing recession will lead to an actual recession. This Insight discusses the concept of a housing recession, reviews housing market trends, and considers the extent to which housing market conditions may affect the broader economy.

Background and Trends

Economists use the phrase housing recession to refer to a downturn in the housing market. While many housing market indicators are considered in general discussions of housing recessions, for the purposes of this Insight, a housing recession will be defined by the amount of and spending on residential construction.

Despite high home prices and rents, homebuilding has slumped. One of the main ways economists measure spending in the housing market is by tracking private fixed residential investment, a component of gross domestic product (GDP). Private fixed residential investment includes all spending on the construction of new single- and multi-family structures (both owner-occupied and rental), residential remodeling, and brokers’ fees. This measure allows economists to not only track spending on housing but also tie it directly to overall economic activity. As shown in Figure 1, below, residential investment has been falling each quarter since the second quarter of 2021, most recently falling by 1.1% in the second quarter of 2023. Decreases in 2023 have been smaller than those throughout 2022, but as a result of nine straight quarters of decline, the level of residential investment is now about $167 billion less in real terms than it was in the first quarter of 2021. By this measure, one could assert that the United States is experiencing a housing recession.."
Housing Recession 

Broadcasting Federal Criminal Proceedings

"The August 1, 2023, criminal indictment of former President Donald Trump has prompted public discussion of whether federal criminal proceedings can be televised or otherwise broadcast to the public. Whether, and potentially how, video of federal court proceedings can be made available has been a topic of interest to policymakers and commentators for decades. The anticipated publicity surrounding the criminal proceedings involving former President Trump has brought renewed attention to the issue, with some lawmakers, observers, and participants calling for the proceedings to be broadcast.

While most state courts allow video coverage of courtroom proceedings under certain circumstances, recording and broadcasting of federal court proceedings is much more limited. In particular, subject to limited exceptions, broadcasting of federal criminal proceedings is prohibited. This Insight explains the current authorities that govern broadcasting of federal criminal proceedings, briefly compares the rules for criminal cases with those that apply to federal civil litigation, and concludes with considerations for Congress related to cameras in federal courts.

Federal Rules and Practice Regarding Courtroom Video

Prior to 1990,the Code of Conduct for United States Judges prohibited any photography or broadcasting of federal cases. The Judicial Conference of the United States then adopted a policy enabling judges toauthorize cameras in the courtroom under certain circumstances. . Separate procedural rules apply to federal criminal and civil proceedings and affect the use of courtroom cameras.

Federal Criminal Cases

Former President Trump’s criminal case based on the August 1 indictment is proceeding in federal district court. The Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure (Criminal Rules) govern procedure in all criminalproceedings in U.S. district courts, courts of appeals, and the Supreme Court. Federal Rule of CriminalProcedure 53 (Criminal Rule 53) provides: “Except as otherwise provided by a statute or these rules, the court must not permit the taking of photographs . . . or the broadcasting of judicial proceedings from the courtroom.” 

As authorized in Criminal Rule 53, certain exceptions to this prohibition have been made, generally involving using video technology to facilitate courtroom proceedings rather than to broadcast them. Criminal Rules 5(g), 10(c), 40(d), and 43(b)(2) allow courts to conduct limited categories of criminal proceedings by “video teleconferencing” with the defendant’s consent. In addition, Section 15002(b) of the Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Security Act (CARES Act), enacted March 27, 2020, allowed federal courts to authorize the handling of certain criminal proceedings by video or audio conference in response to the COVID-19 pandemic; this authorization ended May 10, 2023.

The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit allows cameras with advance permission. The court also provides live video streaming of oral arguments and posts videos of arguments in both civil and criminal appeals online.."
Federal Criminal Proceedings 

Federal and State Courts: Structure and Interaction

"Federal and State Courts: Structure and Interaction

In the United States, the federal government and the states each have their own set of laws and their own court systems. Federal and state courts vary in structure, with significant differences between the federal and state judiciaries as well as variation among the different states. Federal and state courts generally operate separately, but there is not an absolute division between the federal and state judicial systems. Sometimes, state courts decide questions of state law and federal courts decide questions of federal law. However, state courts can also hear many types of federal law claims, and there are circumstances in which federal courts apply state law. Federal courts can also review state court decisions that may conflict with the U.S. Constitution or federal law. In addition, cases or legal issues can move between the two judicial systems. This report provides an overview of the different structures and functions of federal and state courts and the relationship between the two judicial systems.

The report first provides an overview of the federal judiciary. The federal judicial system includes courts established under Article III of the Constitution, with judges who are appointed by the President with the advice and consent of the Senate. Judges appointed to these courts hold office “during good Behaviour” (which has been interpreted to grant them tenure for life unless they resign or are impeached and removed) and are also protected from having their salaries diminished while in office. The federal judicial system also includes other tribunals, sometimes called Article I courts or legislative courts, whose judges do not have the same constitutional protections as Article III judges. The Constitution limits the matters Article I courts can decide, but these courts can hear cases in territorial courts and military courts, “public rights” cases involving disputes between private actors and the government, and cases where decisionmakers serve as “adjuncts” to Article III courts.

This report also surveys key features of state court systems, highlighting general trends and differences between the state and federal judicial systems. It then discusses legal issues concerning the relationship between federal and state courts, including the jurisdiction of federal and state courts, when state courts apply federal law and vice versa, federal review of state court decisions and other state actions, and how cases or legal issues may move between state and federal court. The report concludes with discussion of selected considerations for Congress, including whether to direct cases to federal or state court and federal funding for federal and state courts. An appendix to the report includes additional information about selection and retention of judges on each state’s highest court..."
Federal and State Courts 

Constitution Annotated: A Research Guide

"Constitution Annotated: A Research Guide.

A research guide on the Constitution of the United States of America: Analysis and Interpretation ("Constitution Annotated") and related constitutional law resources.

Consistent with the mission of the Library of Congress’s Congressional Research Service (CRS), the Constitution of the United States of America: Analysis and Interpretation; ("Constitution Annotated") provides authoritative, objective, and non-partisan legal analysis of Supreme Court case law and, where relevant, historical practices that have defined the text and interpretation of the Constitution. In publication for over 100 years, the Constitution Annotated provides essential information to Congress and the public at large about the Constitution's history, meaning, and interpretation.

This research guide is dedicated to helping the general reader navigate and understand the Constitution Annotated, whether they are seasoned attorneys, university students writing a term paper, or anyone interested in the Constitution and how it relates to current issues...:
Constitution Annotated 

TikTok: Technology Overview and Issues

"TikTok is a globally popular video-sharing smartphone application (app) owned by ByteDance Ltd., a privately held company headquartered in Beijing, China. It is under increasing scrutiny by the U.S. government as a potential privacy and security risk to U.S. citizens. This is because ByteDance, as with all technology companies doing business in China, is subject to Chinese laws that require companies operating in the country to turn over user data when asked by the Chinese government. Researchers differ over how TikTok data collection compares with other social media apps and whether TikTok poses a threat to the privacy and security of its U.S. users.

TikTok launched in the United States in August 2018. The app is available in about 150 countries in 75 languages and has approximately 1 billion monthly active users. In the United States, the app has approximately 150 million monthly active users. TikTok’s appeal lies heavily in what has been called its “addictive” video feed, called the “For You” feed. The app builds this feed through a “recommendation engine” that uses artificial intelligence (AI) technologies and data mining practices. According to the company, the recommendation engine relies on a complex set of weighted factors to recommend content, including hashtags and videos watched previously, as well as the kind of user device. TikTok critics cite problems with how much data TikTok collects from and about its users and with how that data is stored—and could be shared. Some critics have also raised concerns about how TikTok promotes certain content to users and the potential to spread misinformation or propaganda.

On August 6, 2020, then-President Trump signed an executive order aimed at stopping TikTok from doing business in the United States. If the order had gone into effect on September 27, 2020, as scheduled, it would have prohibited any U.S. company or person from “transacting” with ByteDance. On August 14, 2020, President Trump issued a second executive order stating that ByteDance must divest from all assets that support TikTok’s U.S. operations and destroy all previously collected U.S. user data. Divestiture may be accomplished by finding a U.S. buyer for TikTok. The requirements were designed to limit the Chinese government’s access to current and future data from U.S. TikTok users. ByteDance did not want to divest from TikTok and sued the Trump Administration. In 2021, President Biden rescinded both executive orders, but his Administration is still considering options to curtail TikTok’s ability to operate in the United States.

On September 14, 2020, Oracle announced that it had reached an agreement with ByteDance to “serve as [the company’s] trusted technology provider” in the United States. It is unclear whether this deal would have satisfied the conditions in President Trump’s now-rescinded executive orders. Then-Secretary of the Treasury Steven Mnuchin said that the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States (CFIUS) would review the proposal and present President Trump with its opinion. Negotiations between TikTok and CFIUS remain ongoing.

During the 118th Congress, some Members have introduced various bills that would affect TikTok’s ability to continue operating in the United States. For example, Representative Michael McCaul introduced the Deterring America’s Technological Adversaries (DATA) Act (H.R. 1153) on February 24, 2023, which was reported favorably by the House Foreign Affairs Committee on May 16, 2023 (H.Rept. 118-63); Representative Kat Cammack introduced the Chinese-owned Applications Using the Information of Our Nation (CAUTION) Act of 2023 (H.R. 750) on February 2, 2023; Representative Ken Buck introduce the No TikTok on United States Devices Act (H.R. 503) on January 25, 2023; Senator Josh Hawley introduced the No TikTok on United States Devices Act (S. 85) on January 25, 2023; Representative Brian Babin introduced the Terminate TikTok on Campus Act of 2023 (H.R. 231) on January 10, 2023; and Representative Jack Bergman introduced the Protecting Personal Data from Foreign Adversaries Act (H.R. 57) on January 9, 2023. Additionally, the House Committee on Energy and Commerce held a hearing on TikTok on March 23, 2023, titled “TikTok: How Congress Can Safeguard American Data Privacy and Protect Children from Online Harms.”.."
TikTok 

Supreme Court Narrows Federal Jurisdiction Under Clean Water Act

"On May 25, 2023, the Supreme Court decided Sackett v. EPA, a case with significant implications for the scope of federal jurisdiction under the Clean Water Act (CWA). While the Court unanimously agreed that the lower court applied the wrong standard for determining when wetlands are considered “waters of the United States” (WOTUS) based on their adjacency to other jurisdictional waters, it split 5-4 on the appropriate test.

The majority formally adopted the approach taken by a four-Justice plurality in the 2006 case Rapanos v.United States. Under the majority’s test, “waters” are limited to relatively permanent bodies of water connected to traditional navigable waters and to wetlands that are “waters of the United States” in their own right by virtue of a continuous surface connection to other jurisdictional waters so that there is no clear demarcation between the bodies. Wetlands that are neighboring covered waters but are separated by natural or artificial barriers are excluded.

The CWA prohibits discharging certain pollutants into navigable waters, defined as “the waters of the United States, including the territorial seas” without a permit, but the statute does not define WOTUS. The definition of WOTUS is important because it determines which waters are subject to federal government regulations and protections, including CWA permitting programs. In January 2023, the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (Corps) and the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA)—the two agencies tasked with implementing the CWA—issued a final rule redefining WOTUS. (See this report for an in-depth discussion of the rule and the previous regulations promulgated to define the term.) The Court’s ruling in Sackett construes the reach of the CWA more narrowly than the new or previous regulatory interpretations or the approach adopted by the courts of appeals since Rapanos. While the Sackett decision does not directly address the merits of the new rule, its rejection of several elements included in the rule casts doubt on the current regulatory framework. It also evinces the Court’s decreasing reliance on deferential modes of statutory construction as well as its increasing insistence on clear congressional authorization for agency action..."
Supreme Court and Clean Water Act 

Election Worker Safety and Privacy

"Concerns about election workers’ safety and privacy have been reported since the 2020 election, in news reports and testimony before House and Senate committees. Some election workers have raised concerns about their physical safety while performing official duties, as well as threats to their safety and privacy outside the workplace and related psychological effects. Those concerns, along with a perceived increase in politically motivated job scrutiny, have led some to leave, or consider leaving, their roles.

This Insight provides a brief overview of executive branch activities, legislative proposals, and policy considerations related to election worker safety and privacy. For more information, see CRS Legal Sidebar LSB10781, Overview of Federal Criminal Laws Prohibiting Threats and Harassment of Election Workers, by Jimmy Balser.

Background

Federal law prohibits certain types of intimidation of or interference with election workers, including intimidation to discourage serving as a poll watcher or election official or intimidation as a result of such service (18 U.S.C. §245); interference by members of the Armed Forces with election officials’ exercise of their duties (18 U.S.C. §593); and intimidation for helping voters register (52 U.S.C. §20511) or vote (52 U.S.C. §§10307, 20511). Many states have laws that address other threats to election workers, such as through privacy protections for election commissioners. More general laws—such as prohibitions against voter intimidation (e.g., 52 U.S.C. §§10101, 10307, 20511) or harassing or threatening interstatecommunications—might also apply to some conduct.

Some state and local officials have responded to recent reports of threats to election workers with administrative action or legislative proposals. Election officials have included local law enforcement in poll worker trainings, for example, and implemented new security measures in their offices. State legislators have introduced or enacted new prohibitions or protections, including enacted state measures such as a New Hampshire law that prohibits intimidating election officials to interfere with their work, an Oregon law that extends existing privacy protections to election workers, and a Nevada law that provides for new protections against election official doxing and intimidation.."
Election Workers 

Is That Climate Change? The Science of Extreme Event Attribution

"Climate change attribution is the study of whether, or to what degree, human influence may have contributed to extreme climate or weather events. Scientists can now estimate whether human activities have influenced extreme weather or climate events and changed how likely they are to occur. This is known as the science of climate change attribution.

Attributions of extreme weather to human-induced climate change may affect how policymakers, organizations, and individuals understand and manage associated risks, with the potential benefit of avoiding future costs. The interpretation and evaluation of attribution findings have been part of the discussion of policy on wildfires, heat waves, climate change, and disaster responses, among other issues. Understanding the attribution process and its uncertainties may be helpful in understanding the potential uses and limitations of climate attribution claims.

Before the development of extreme event attribution methods, there was a scientific consensus that, while attribution of global climate trends was possible, attribution of individual events was not possible. This changed with the development of statistical methods to determine the likelihood that human influence had changed the frequency or severity of extreme events, and a better understanding of the connections between components of the Earth’s climate system.

Several approaches to extreme event attribution have been developed, including a risk-based approach, which seeks to estimate human-influenced changes in the probability of an extreme event, and a storyline approach, which seeks to estimate the relative contribution of specific natural and human causes to an extreme event. The two approaches use many of the same analytic tools. Researchers may study different aspects of the same event, or use differing yet valid analytic methods and find results that seem inconsistent.

Numerous attribution studies have been completed on a wide range of extreme events, including heavy rainfall, heat waves, sea ice extent, consecutive dry days, droughts, and others. Results have included instances where changes in event probability were attributed to human influence, instances where evidence of human influence was not found, and instances where the results were inconclusive. For example, a study of record high May 2017 temperatures in South Korea found that the increased probability of such an event was due to human influence, while a study of a 2011 drought/heat wave in Texas did not find evidence of human influence. In recent years, domestic litigation has been brought by states and municipalities seeking compensation for damage caused by adverse climate impacts. Extreme event attribution may become important in this type of litigation in order to establish liability..."
Climate Change 

Criminal Prohibitions on Leaks and Other Disclosures of Classified Defense Information

"High-profile leaks and disclosures of protected government information have prompted frequent congressional interest in the criminal penalties for disclosing government secrets. In one recent case, a U.S. Air National Guardsman allegedly posted photographs on social media of documents that, according to media outlets, contained classified information about the Russia-Ukraine war and other international affairs.

No single statute criminalizes all unauthorized disclosure of protected government information. Rather, the legal framework is based on a complex and often overlapping set of statutes or individual provisions within statutes, which are outlined in this report. Criminal prosecutions arising from unauthorized disclosures frequently focus on the Espionage Act, with specific charges varying based on certain factors. Successful prosecutions can result in punishments ranging from severe penalties and imprisonment for “classic spying” cases (when an individual collects information in an effort to provide aid to a foreign government) to less severe penalties for cases such as failing to report that protected information has been mishandled or lost.

Historically, the United States has prosecuted under the Espionage Act and related statutes (1) individuals with access to classified information (and a corresponding obligation to protect it) who make it available to foreign agents and (2) foreign agents who obtain classified information unlawfully while present in the United States. The United States has also prosecuted individuals claiming an altruistic desire to expose protected information to the public based on their belief that the public good favors transparency into particular government activities. While not every prosecution against an alleged “whistleblower” has been successful, no individual has been acquitted on the grounds that the public interest in the leaked information was so significant as to justify an otherwise unlawful disclosure.

Some have questioned whether the Espionage Act covers only initial disclosure of protected information or whether it also criminalizes the receipt and publication of that information by third parties, such as the press. The United States has never prosecuted a traditional news organization for receiving and publicizing leaked information, but it has extended its prosecution efforts to the individual not responsible for the initial disclosure. This report examines prosecutions of individuals who leak information to the press or policy organizations, such as lobbying groups and think tanks, as well as civil and criminal actions that have been brought against the recipients of leaked information.

Prosecutions and legal proceedings arising out of leaks may also implicate First Amendment issues regarding freedom of speech and freedom of the press. At the same time, exposure of protected information may harm U.S. national security. Because these cases can raise First Amendment concerns regarding freedom of speech and freedom of the press, the constitutional framework relevant to prosecutions and other legal proceedings filed as a result of leaked classified information is also analyzed in this report, discussing ways Members of Congress who are evaluating criminal prohibitions on disclosures of protected information may seek to balance these competing interests within the constitutional framework..."
Leaked Classified Defense Information