Election Worker Safety and Privacy

"Concerns about election workers’ safety and privacy have been reported since the 2020 election, in news reports and testimony before House and Senate committees. Some election workers have raised concerns about their physical safety while performing official duties, as well as threats to their safety and privacy outside the workplace and related psychological effects. Those concerns, along with a perceived increase in politically motivated job scrutiny, have led some to leave, or consider leaving, their roles.

This Insight provides a brief overview of executive branch activities, legislative proposals, and policy considerations related to election worker safety and privacy. For more information, see CRS Legal Sidebar LSB10781, Overview of Federal Criminal Laws Prohibiting Threats and Harassment of Election Workers, by Jimmy Balser.

Background

Federal law prohibits certain types of intimidation of or interference with election workers, including intimidation to discourage serving as a poll watcher or election official or intimidation as a result of such service (18 U.S.C. §245); interference by members of the Armed Forces with election officials’ exercise of their duties (18 U.S.C. §593); and intimidation for helping voters register (52 U.S.C. §20511) or vote (52 U.S.C. §§10307, 20511). Many states have laws that address other threats to election workers, such as through privacy protections for election commissioners. More general laws—such as prohibitions against voter intimidation (e.g., 52 U.S.C. §§10101, 10307, 20511) or harassing or threatening interstatecommunications—might also apply to some conduct.

Some state and local officials have responded to recent reports of threats to election workers with administrative action or legislative proposals. Election officials have included local law enforcement in poll worker trainings, for example, and implemented new security measures in their offices. State legislators have introduced or enacted new prohibitions or protections, including enacted state measures such as a New Hampshire law that prohibits intimidating election officials to interfere with their work, an Oregon law that extends existing privacy protections to election workers, and a Nevada law that provides for new protections against election official doxing and intimidation.."
Election Workers 

Election Worker Safety and Privacy

"Concerns about election workers’ safety and privacy have been reported following the 2020 election, in news reports and testimony before House and Senate committees. Some election workers have raised concerns about physical safety while performing official duties, as well as more general threats outside the workplace or related psychological effects. These threats, along with a perceived increase in politically motivated job scrutiny, have led some to leave, or consider leaving, their roles.

This Insight provides a brief overview of recent developments, legislative proposals, and policy considerations related to election worker safety and privacy.

Background

Federal law prohibits certain types of intimidation of or interference with election workers, including intimidation to discourage serving as a poll watcher or election official or intimidation as a result of such service (18 U.S.C. §245); interference by members of the Armed Forces with election officials’ exercise of their duties (18 U.S.C. §593); and intimidation for helping voters register (52 U.S.C. §20511) or vote (52 U.S.C. §§10307, 20511). Many states have laws that address other threats to election workers, such as through privacy protections for election commissioners. More general laws—such as prohibitions against voter intimidation (e.g. 52 U.S.C. §§10101, 10307, 20511) or harassing or threatening interstate communications—might also apply to some conduct.

Some state and local officials have responded to recent reports of threats to election workers with administrative action or legislative proposals. Election officials have included local law enforcement in poll worker trainings, for example, and implemented new security measures in their offices. Bills have been introduced in state legislatures to establish new prohibitions or protections, such as a Michiganproposal to prohibit intimidation of election workers and a Washington State bill to extend existing privacy protections to election officials..."
Election workers 

The U.S. Presidential Election: Managing the Risks of Violence

[International Crisis Group]
"As the 3 November U.S. presidential election approaches, the country faces an unfamiliar danger. While Americans have grown used to a certain level of rancour in these quadrennial campaigns, they have not in living memory faced the realistic prospect that the incumbent may reject the outcome or that armed violence may result. That has changed in 2020 because of the emergence of risk factors that would spell trouble in any country: political polarisation bound up with issues of race and identity; the rise of armed groups with political agendas; the higher-than-usual chances of a contested outcome; and most importantly President Donald Trump, whose toxic rhetoric and willingness to court conflict to advance his personal interests have no precedent in modern U.S. history. The risk of unrest may ebb and flow as the final days of the campaign unfold, but it is almost certain to remain, and it will increase if either side forms the impression that the vote has been rigged.

At some level, it should not be surprising that the United States now faces the spectre of electoral violence. The U.S. has seen slavery, civil war, lynching, labour strife and the ethnic cleansing of indigenous peoples. The wounds of those legacies have never fully healed. The country is awash in firearms, has gun homicide levels unmatched by any other high-income country, and is home to a white supremacy movement that, as discussed below, is growing in virulence. Racial injustice, economic inequality and police brutality are chronic sources of tension, which periodically bubbles over into large-scale peaceful demonstrations and, sometimes, civil unrest. By way of recent example, the police killing of an unarmed Black man, George Floyd, in Minnesota state’s largest city of Minneapolis on 25 May generated a wave of protests and counter-protests that has diminished but not fully subsided five months later..."
Presidential election 

The 2020 Elections: Selected Resources for Members and Constituents

"The onset of the COVID-19 pandemic and reports of potential election interference might raise questions for Members and constituents about the 2020 elections. Potential disinformation campaigns and changes to election procedures in response to COVID-19 might make it more difficult for voters to determine how to register and vote. Voters might also be concerned about possible effects of COVID-19 or interference efforts on their safety or on the security of election workers or the electoral process itself.

This Insight shares selected resources Members and constituents might find helpful for navigating such questions. It links to information about (1) how to register and vote in 2020, and (2) how federal agencies are responding to potential election interference efforts and election effects of COVID-19. This product focuses on resources available from government officials and some of the organizations that support them, such as the National Association of Secretaries of State (NASS) and National Conference of StateLegislatures (NCSL). Additional information may be available from media outlets or nonprofit groups.

Registering and Voting in 2020

States, territories, and localities have primary responsibility for administering elections in the United States, and their election officials are generally the most authoritative sources of information about when,where, and how to register and vote. NASS, which represents the officials who serve as the chief electionofficial in most states and territories, and the U.S. Election Assistance Commission (EAC), which was established after the 2000 elections to help improve the administration of federal elections, each maintain a website that links to official state, territorial, and local election information. NASS’s site and the EAC’s site both provide access to contact information for election officials and state-specific tools for performing common voter activities, such as registering to vote, confirming voter registration status, locating a polling place, and checking requirements for voting early or by mail. The U.S. Department of Defense’s Federal Voting Assistance Program, which is charged with carrying out certain responsibilities under the Uniformed and Overseas Citizens Absentee Voting Act of 1986, maintains a Voting AssistanceGuide that is directed primarily at overseas civilians and military personnel..."
2020 Election 

Federal Role in U.S. Campaigns and Elections: An Overview

"Conventional wisdom holds that the federal government plays relatively little role in U.S. campaigns and elections. Although states retain authority for most aspects of election administration, a closer look reveals that the federal government also has steadily increased its presence in campaigns and elections in the past 50 years. Altogether, dozens of congressional committees and federal agencies could be involved in federal elections under current law.

Congress faces a complex mix of traditional oversight areas with developing ones throughout the elections field. Reports of foreign interference during the 2016 election cycle, and concerns about future interference, have raised the profile of campaigns and elections policy in Congress, at federal agencies, and beyond. As Congress considers these and other developing issues, this report provides the House and Senate with a resource for first understanding the current campaigns and elections regulatory structure. The report addresses those areas of law and public policy that most directly and routinely affect American campaigns and elections. This includes six broad categories of law through which Congress has assigned various agencies roles in regulating or supporting campaigns, elections, or both. These are campaign finance; election administration; election security; redistricting; qualifications and contested elections; and voting rights.

No single federal agency is in charge of the federal role in campaigns and elections, just as multiple statutes address various aspects of the field. The Election Assistance Commission and Federal Election Commission are devoted entirely to campaigns and elections. Congress has charged other departments and agencies—such as the Department of Justice, Department of Defense, and component organizations comprising the Intelligence Community—primarily with responsibilities for other areas of public policy, but also with supporting or administering campaigns and elections policy in specific cases. Other agencies or statutes may be relevant in specific cases..".
"

Campaigns and elections

Election Security: Issues in the 2018 Midterm Elections

"In the wake of assessments about foreign interference in the 2016 presidential election, concerns have been mounting about the security of the 2018 midterm elections. Security efforts are complicated by the complex, multidimensional election life cycle, with each dimension involving a broad array of components. The main dimensions can be thought of as election administration, campaign activities, and media coverage.

Traditionally, concerns about election security have focused largely on election administration. In the wake of the 2016 election, the Department of Homeland Security designated election-administration infrastructure as a critical infrastructure (CI) subsector. That made the state and local offices and privatesector entities involved in running elections eligible for enhanced federal technical assistance and information sharing on both physical- and cyber-security.

The CI designation expressly applies only to the election-administration dimension. However, malicious actors are unlikely to respect such limitations. The increasing use of internet connectivity in all three dimensions is creating a convergence of security risks not only within the dimensions but across them

 Attacks on election infrastructure might involve registration databases, voting systems, reporting of results, or other components or processes. The goal might be to exfiltrate (surreptitiously obtain) information such as voter files, to disrupt the election process, or even to change vote counts and results. Congressional Research Service 7-.... www.crs.gov IN10955 Congressional Research Service 2

 Attacks on political parties and campaigns might involve exfiltration of candidate information or communications, disruption of events, or other goals. For example, data from the information networks of a political party could offer a foreign adversary insights into the prospective operations, priorities, and vulnerabilities of an incoming government, should the party prevail at the polls.

 Exploits involving media coverage, especially social media, might include, for example, spreading false or misleading information to voters with the aim of affecting their votes or eroding confidence in the election outcome. Voter information obtained through attacks on political party or government entities, or by other means, could be used to target voters considered susceptible to such misinformation. For example, Cambridge Analytica reportedly acquired and used data on more than 50 million Facebook users to influence voters in the 2016 U.S. presidential election and Brexit referendum. Although Facebook maintains that the case did not constitute a data breach, the legality of how such information was and is obtained, as well as its potential impacts, remains controversial. Both House and Senate committees have held hearings on the topic.."
Election security

ELECTION SECURITY UPDATE Top 18 Most Vulnerable States

"It is now well-known that Russian hackers targeted voter registration databases in at least 21 states and attempted to access credentials of election technology vendors and election officials.1 If these attacks had succeeded, hackers could have deleted voter registration records, altered poll books, caused chaos on Election Day, and potentially swayed the results of the election. Moreover, the Intelligence Community has warned that foreign actors will likely continue to seek to interfere in our elections.2 In May, Secretary of Homeland Security, Kirstjen Nielsen said, “We see [Russia] continuing to conduct foreign influence campaigns.”3 In June, Robert Mueller echoed this finding, stating in a court filing that foreign “individuals and entities” are continuing to “engage in interference operations.” 4

In light of the ongoing threat of foreign interference in our nation’s elections, Congress appropriated $380 million in March 2018 to the Election Assistance Commission (EAC) for distribution to states to enhance election security. While this money is a useful down payment, we have found that it will cost an additional $1.4 billion over ten years for states to be able to take all the steps required to secure their election systems. In addition, at a hearing in June held by the Senate Rules and Administration Committee, state election officials told lawmakers that they needed additional federal funds to be able to fully secure their election infrastructure. Despite this, the appropriations bills currently being considered in the House of Representatives do not contain additional funding for election security.5

This report looks at the eighteen states with the most vulnerable election infrastructure and assesses: 1) whether they have requested the EAC grant money; 2) how the state plans on spending the grant money; and 3) whether the state’s response is sufficient given the threats and vulnerabilities it is facing. The states are organized in three tiers..":
Election security

Recent State Election Law Challenges: In Brief

"During the final months and weeks leading up to the November 8, 2016, presidential election, courts across the country have ruled in numerous challenges to state election laws. For example, there have been recent court rulings affecting the laws regulating early voting, voter photo identification (ID) requirements, registration procedures, straight-party voting, and voter rolls. Accordingly, many such laws have been recently invalidated, enjoined, or altered. Others continue to be subject to litigation.

Recent rulings in Michigan, North Carolina, Ohio, and Texas are illustrative examples. In Michigan, a court preliminarily enjoined a 2016 law that ended the ability of voters to vote for a political party’s entire slate of candidates with a single notation—straight-party voting— concluding that it was likely that the challengers would succeed on the merits of their claims under Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act (VRA) and the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. In North Carolina, a court invalidated several recent changes to that state’s election laws, including a voter photo ID law, holding that the laws were enacted with a racially discriminatory intent in violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and Section 2 of the VRA. In Ohio, a court held that a law setting forth the process for removing the names of inactive voters from the voter rolls violates the National Voter Registration Act, and in another case, upheld a law that eliminated a period of early voting and same-day registration, known as “Golden Week,” against a challenge under the Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection Clause and Section 2 of the VRA. Finally, in contrast to the North Carolina ruling, a court declined to invalidate a Texas voter photo ID law, but required it to be administered on November 8, 2016, with modifications, holding that the law has a discriminatory effect on minority voting rights in violation of Section 2 of the VRA..."
Election law challenges

Electorate Profiles: Selected Characteristics of the Citizen, 18 and Older Population

"The following tables present estimates of the citizen, 18 and older population for all states and congressional districts. Selected characteristics include age, sex, race, Hispanic Origin, educational attainment, poverty status, and household income. The data used in these tables come from the 2015 American Community Survey (ACS). For general background on the ACS, please visit http://www.census.gov/programs-surveys/acs/. For information on the statistical accuracy of the ACS, please visit http://www.census.gov/programs-surveys/acs/technical- documentation/code-lists.html,,"

Electorate population

Electorate Profiles: Selected Characteristics of the Citizen, 18 and Older Populatio

"The following tables present estimates of the citizen, 18 and older population for all states and congressional districts. Selected characteristics include age, sex, race, Hispanic Origin, educational attainment, poverty status, and household income. The data used in these tables come from the 2015 American Community Survey (ACS). For general background on the ACS, please visit http://www.census.gov/programs-surveys/acs/. For information on the statistical accuracy of the ACS, please visit http://www.census.gov/programs-surveys/acs/technical- documentation/code-lists.html..."
Electorate profiles

Legal Processes for Contesting the Results of a Presidential Election

"Questions occasionally surface regarding potential voting fraud or election irregularities in presidential elections. (See, for example, Sean Sullivan and Philip Rucker, “Trump’s Claim of ‘Rigged’ Vote Stirs Fears of Trouble,” Washington Post, October 18, 2016, p. A1; Edward-Isaac Dovere, “Fears Mount on Trump’s ‘Rigged Election’ Rhetoric,” Politico, October 16, 2016; Daniel Kurtzleben, “5 Reasons (And Then Some) Not to Worry About A ‘Rigged’ Election,” NPR, October 18, 2016). If legitimate and verifiable allegations of voting fraud, or indications of misconduct by election officials on election day are presented, what legal recourses are available to complainants to litigate and potentially to remedy such wrongs and to contest the result of a presidential election?

Presidential elections are conducted in each state and the District of Columbia to select “electors” from that state who will meet and formally vote for a candidate for President on the first Monday following the second Wednesday in December. Under the United States Constitution, these elections for presidential electors are administered and regulated in the first instance by the states, and state laws have established the procedures for ballot security, tallying the votes, challenging the vote count, recounts, and election contests within their respective jurisdictions. A candidate or voters challenging the results of a presidential election in a particular state would thus initially seek to contest the results of that election in the state according to the procedures and deadlines set out in the laws of that specific state..."
Election Contestation

How Can the Results of a Presidential Election Be Contested?

"In the midst of the presidential campaign season, the possibility of election fraud has been raised. This discussion briefly examines how the results of a presidential election may be contested.

Although it has national impact, the presidential election is in essence 50 state and District of Columbia elections for presidential electors, held on the same day throughout the country. Therefore—and consistent with the states’ traditional authority over the administration of elections within their jurisdictions—states have the initial responsibility for resolving challenges, recounts, and contests to the results of a presidential election.

Specifically, the Electoral Count Act of 1887, as amended, contemplates that contests and challenges to the vote for presidential electors are to be initially handled in the states. Codified in part at 3 U.S.C. § 5, the law provides that if a contest or challenge in a state to the election or appointment of presidential electors is resolved in that state before the sixth day prior to the meeting of the electors, such determination shall be “conclusive” and shall “govern” when Congress counts the electoral votes as directed by the Twelfth Amendment. The Supreme Court has referred to this as the “safe harbor” provision. This year, the presidential electors are scheduled to meet on December 19. Six days prior is December 13, which therefore, will be the last day for the states to make a final determination in order for it to be conclusive when Congress counts the votes..."
Contested Elections

Combined Federal/State Disclosure and Election Directory 2016

"This Directory has been prepared as a guidebook to locate and identify organizations and individuals at the state and national level who have a responsibility to disclose information on money in politics.

The term “money in politics” has been given a broad definition to include federal and state campaign finance reports, lobby reports, personal financial statements, public financing, state initiative/referendum spending, and a wide range of other financial filings..."
Disclosure and election directory

Demographic and Economic Profiles of Washington’s Electorate

"In advance of the Washington caucus on March 26 and primary on May 24, the Census Bureau presents a variety of statistics that give an overall profile of the state’s voting-age population and industries. Statistics include:

• Voting-age population and estimate of eligible voters (i.e., citizens age 18 and older).
• Breakdown of voting-age population by race and Hispanic origin (Hispanic origin and race alone) (race alone or in combination).
• Selected economic characteristics, including median household income and poverty.
• Selected social characteristics, including educational attainment.
• County Business Patterns (providing information on employment by specific industries).
• Statistics on voting and registration..."

Washington electorate

What Happens Next in the Election Process

"Here’s a look at what happens between now and the inauguration:

Between now and December 17:

The governors of all of the states must certify the election results, and provide copies of the Certificates of Ascertainment to the Archivist of the United States and your state’s electors.

December 17:

Electors meet in their state and cast their ballots for the President and Vice President. A copy of these votes is sent to the Vice President for the official count in Congress. The votes must be received by December 26.

January 6:

Congress meets in a joint session to officially count the electoral votes. As President of the Senate, the Vice President oversees the process and announces the final results.

January 20:

January 20 is the official day of the inauguration, however, this year because it falls on a Sunday, the public swearing in ceremony will be held on Monday, January 21, 2013..."

What Happens Next in the Election Process

2012-2013 Presidential Election Period: National Security Considerations and Options

 "This report discusses historical national security-related presidential transition activities, provides a representative sampling of national security issues a new Administration may encounter, and offers considerations and options relevant to each of the five phases of the presidential election period. Each phase has distinct challenges and opportunities for the incoming Administration, the outgoing Administration, and Congress. This report is intended to provide a framework for national security considerations during the current election period and will be updated to reflect the election outcome..."
https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/R42773.pdf

Voting and Registration in the Election of November 2008
"...In the 2008 presidential election, 64 percent of voting-age citizens voted, an estimate not statistically different from the percent that turned out in 2004, but higher than the presidential elections of 2000 and 1996 (Table 1).Overall, 131 million people voted in 2008, a turnout increase of about 5 million people since 2004. During this same 4-year period, the voting-age citizen
population in the United States increased by roughly 9 million people.

In 2008, 71 percent of voting-age citizens were registered to vote, a decrease compared to the 72 percent who were registered in 2004. The 2008 election had a higher registration rate than the
presidential election of 2000, but was not statistically diff erent from the 1996 rate. Overall, 146 million people were registered to vote in 2008, an increase of approximately 4 million people since
2004..."

FEC RELEASES FEDERAL ELECTIONS 2008 REPORT
"The Federal Election Commission (FEC) today released Federal Elections 2008 (http://www.fec.gov/pubrec/fe2008/federalelections2008.shtml), a biennial publication that compiles federal election results in the 50 states, five territories and the District of Columbia for the offices of President, Senate, and House of Representatives, as well as Delegates. The comprehensive report is a research tool designed to provide an accurate, historical record of federal election results in a single volume..."

Justice Department Meets with Civil Rights Groups to Discuss Plans for Protecting Ballot Access
"Attorney General Michael B. Mukasey, Acting Assistant Attorney General for the Civil Rights Division Grace Chung Becker, and other senior officials of the Department of Justice (DOJ) met today with leaders of dozens of civil rights groups, as well as national organizations representing state and local officials, secretaries of state and attorneys general offices from across the country, to review plans to protect voting rights in the upcoming federal election.

"The Justice Department must make every effort to help ensure that the November elections are run as smoothly as possible - and, equally important, that the American people have confidence in our electoral process," Attorney General Mukasey said. "Communicating openly with groups interested in the protection of voting rights and with the state and local officials primarily responsible for administering our elections is vital to that effort."

"As the United States Supreme Court has recognized, the right to vote is fundamental because it is preservative of all our other rights," said Acting Assistant Attorney General Becker. "Vigorous enforcement of all our voting laws is a priority for the Civil Rights Division."

The meetings today are part of the Department's continuing effort under the Ballot Access and Voting Integrity Initiative, which was established in October 2002 to expand efforts to address election crimes and voting rights violations. The two overarching goals of the initiative are to ensure fair voting access and to protect the integrity of the election process..."

Google: 2008 US Election Trends
"Track the most searched elections-related terms below, and find out which candidates are hot in different cities. Find out how other Americans stay politically engaged online."