"Iraq’s sectarian and ethnic divisions—muted toward the end of the 2003-2011 U.S. military
intervention in Iraq—are fueling a major challenge to Iraq’s stability and to U.S. policy in Iraq
and the broader Middle East region. The resentment of Iraq’s Sunni Arabs toward the Shiitedominated
central government facilitated the capture in 2014 of nearly one-third of Iraqi territory
by the Sunni Islamist extremist group called the Islamic State (IS, also known as ISIL, ISIS, or
the Arabic acronym Da'esh). Iraq’s Kurds are separately embroiled in political, territorial, and
economic disputes with Baghdad, but those differences have been at least temporarily
subordinated to the common struggle against the Islamic State.
U.S. officials assert that the Iraqi government must work to gain the loyalty of more of Iraq’s
Sunnis—and to resolve differences with the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG)—if an
eventual defeat of the Islamic State is to result in long-term stability. Prospects for greater intercommunal
unity appeared to increase in 2014 with the replacement of former Prime Minister Nuri
al-Maliki with the current Prime Minister, Haydar al-Abbadi. Although both men are from the
Shiite Islamist Da’wa Party, Abbadi has taken some steps to try to compromise with Sunnis and
with the KRG. However, a significant point of contention with the KRG remains the KRG’s
marketing of crude oil exports separately from Baghdad..."
Iraq
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