Information for Afghan Nationals on Parole Into the United States

"Background:

Individuals who are outside of the United States may request parole into the United States based on urgent humanitarian or significant public benefit reasons for a temporary period, on a case-by-case basis. If USCIS authorizes parole, we will specify its duration. While parole allows for lawful presence in the United States, the parolee technically remains an applicant for admission. Parole does not confer immigration status and does not provide a path to permanent residency or the ability to obtain lawful immigration status. However, a parolee may be able to obtain lawful status in the United States through other means.

The U.S. government is making every effort to assist individuals who have been granted parole into the United States. Due to quickly changing circumstances in the region and the closure of the U.S. Embassy in Kabul, beneficiaries may experience delays in processing their cases and may need to arrange travel to a U.S. embassy outside of Afghanistan to continue processing their parole request.

Eligibility:

USCIS may exercise discretion to authorize parole on a case-by-case basis for individuals with urgent humanitarian or significant public benefit reasons to come to the United States for a temporary period. To avoid delays, all relevant supporting evidence to show that the beneficiary qualifies for parole and merits a favorable exercise of discretion must be submitted with the Form I-131, Application for Travel Document. USCIS provides guidance on documentation to support parole requests on its webpage, Guidance on Evidence for Certain Types of Humanitarian or Significant Public Benefit Parole Requests.

How to Apply:

Anyone may request parole for themselves, or on behalf of another individual, by filing a Form I-131, Application for Travel Document, along with a statement explaining the beneficiary’s urgent humanitarian circumstances and including any relevant evidence supporting the parole request. It is essential that the beneficiary’s best contact information (email address, phone number, and local address) is included in the parole application, either on the Form I-131’s applicable section or on a supplemental document, and that USCIS is notified of any changes to that contact information. If the beneficiary is able to make private arrangements to travel to a third country where there is a U.S. embassy or where consular services are available, please notify USCIS immediately at HumanitarianParole@uscis.dhs.gov.

The Form I-131 must include the applicable filing fee or fee waiver request using Form I-912, Request for Fee Waiver. See the USCIS webpage on Additional Information on Filing a Fee Waiver. Each family member must file a separate Form I-131 with required fees or Form I-912 and supporting documentation. Write “Afghanistan Humanitarian Parole” on the mailing envelope. For expedited processing, write the word EXPEDITE in the top right corner of the application in black ink. Detailed instructions for filing for humanitarian parole can be found on the USCIS webpage on Humanitarian or Significant Public Benefit Parole for Individuals Outside the United States..."
Afghan nationals 

U.S. Military Withdrawal and Taliban Takeover in Afghanistan: Frequently Asked Questions

"On August 15, 2021, the Taliban entered the Afghan capital of Kabul, completing a rapid takeover over the country that surprised many Afghans and Americans alike. The Taliban’s advance came as the United States was completing the military withdrawal to which it agreed in the February 2020 U.S.-Taliban accord. The fall of the elected Afghan government, supported by billions of dollars in U.S. assistance over the course of nearly two decades, raises significant questions about past, present, and future U.S. policy for Members of Congress. This report provides material related to select questions associated with U.S. policy in Afghanistan, including:

 Background information useful for understanding the current situation in Afghanistan;
 The Taliban takeover and Afghan government’s collapse;
 U.S. policy implications of the Taliban takeover;
 Social and economic implications of the Taliban takeover;
 Regional reactions to the Taliban’s takeover;
 U.S. military operations;and
 Budgetary implications of the U.S. withdrawal.

Some additional lines of inquiry that Congress may wish to explore with the Executive Branch are included alongside specific topics as appropriate. The report concludes with some strategic considerations Congress may wish to contemplate as it assesses the situation in Afghanistan and its implications for the future.

With a general U.S. target date for the completion of the military withdrawal and evacuation operation set at August 31, 2021, the situation on the ground remains extremely fluid. This report will be updated to reflect major changes in U.S. policy or developments in Afghanistan that may significantly affect U.S. decisions.."
U.S. Military withdrawal and Taliban 

Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction: Quarterly Report to the U.S. Congress, July 30, 2021

"I am pleased to submit to Congress, the Secretaries of State and Defense, and the American people,
SIGAR’s 52nd quarterly report on the status of reconstruction in Afghanistan.

This quarter, the United States and its allies withdrew nearly all of their troops from Afghanistan after almost 20 years of war. Fewer than a thousand U.S. military personnel remain there, compared to 110,000 a decade ago. President Joseph R. Biden has said that the United States will continue to provide support for Afghanistan, including for its military and police. The President’s proposed FY 2022 budget includes $3.33 billion for the Afghan National Defense and Security Forces (ANDSF) as well as $364 million in civilian assistance. If appropriated by Congress, these funds would come in addition to the approximately $6.68 billion already appropriated, but yet to be disbursed for Afghanistan.

The news coming out of Afghanistan this quarter has been bleak. The Taliban offensive that began early in the quarter accelerated in June and July. General Mark Milley, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, testified on June 23 that the Taliban controlled about 81 districts. Less than a month later, on July 21, he told reporters the group now controlled about half of Afghanistan’s 419 districts, or more than twice as many as before. According to media reporting, the Taliban also controlled large stretches of multiple major highways, and at least six international border crossings as this report went to press. The ANDSF has retaken some districts and the Afghan government still controls all 34 provincial capitals, including Kabul, but from public reporting, the ANDSF appeared surprised and unready, and is now on its back foot. Civilian casualties hit a record high in May and June, according to the UN Assistance Mission in Afghanistan. The overall trend is clearly unfavorable to the Afghan government, which could face an existential crisis if it isn’t addressed and reversed.

SIGAR’s oversight mission has become both more consequential and more challenging in the absence of a major U.S. troop presence, and in light of the growing insurgent pressure on the Afghan government. Despite repeated reductions in American staff at the U.S. embassy, SIGAR remains the only U.S. oversight agency on the ground in Afghanistan, so maximizing the reach and impact of our statutory duty takes on increased importance. SIGAR issued a letter this quarter to the Administration and Congress proposing four changes that we believe, based on our 13 years of experience, would enhance the protection of continued U.S. taxpayer assistance to Afghanistan. SIGAR’s recommendations and its plans for continued oversight are discussed on page 18 of this report.

A lessons-learned report released this quarter—The Risk of Doing the Wrong Thing Perfectly: Monitoring and Evaluation of Reconstruction Contracting in Afghanistan— explores the now two-decade-long challenge of how to properly assess the effectiveness of reconstruction. The report’s key finding is that, as implemented, monitoring and evaluation (M&E) created the risk of doing the wrong thing perfectly. That is, programs could be deemed “successful” even if they had not achieved or contributed to broader, more important goals—such as creating an effective Afghan security force and a stable Afghanistan. Closely related to this finding is one of the report’s central themes: the pervasiveness of overoptimism. Overall, M&E displayed a tendency to elevate good news and anecdotes over data suggesting a lack of progress. To that extent, the report is especially useful for policymakers and practitioners seeking to understand why the Afghan security forces have continued to struggle despite the U.S. assertions of success that have been hallmarks of reconstruction..".





Special Inspector General Afghanistan 

What we need to Learn: Lessons from twenty years of Afghanistan Reconstruction

"What We Need to Learn: Lessons from Twenty Years of Afghanistan Reconstruction is the 11th lessons learned report issued by the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction. The report examines the past two decades of the U.S. reconstruction effort in Afghanistan. It details how the U.S. government struggled to develop a coherent strategy, understand how long the reconstruction mission would take, ensure its projects were sustainable, staff the mission with trained professionals, account for the challenges posed by insecurity, tailor efforts to the Afghan context, and understand the impact of programs. There have been bright spots—such as lower child mortality rates, increases in per capita GDP, and increased literacy rates. But after spending 20 years and $145 billion trying to rebuild Afghanistan, the U.S. government has many lessons it needs to learn. Implementing these critical lessons will save lives and prevent waste, fraud, and abuse in Afghanistan, and in future reconstruction missions elsewhere around the world.

As a retrospective, the report draws on SIGAR’s 13 years of oversight work, including our 10 prior lessons learned reports and 760 interviews our staff conducted with current and former policymakers, ambassadors, generals, military officers, development experts, and other practitioners. These interviews in particular enable SIGAR to develop a uniquely nuanced understanding of Afghan institutions, the efforts by U.S. officials to reform those institutions, and how those efforts fared. Unlike SIGAR’s previous lessons learned reports, this one does not make new recommendations for U.S. government agencies or the Congress. Instead, it poses questions that policymakers may wish to consider—both in Afghanistan and around the world—and includes some of the most relevant recommendations found in previous lessons learned reports. The questions for policymakers help frame the report’s lessons and direct attention to the most critical issues.

Congress created SIGAR as an independent agency focused solely on the Afghanistan mission and its reconstruction issues. Unlike most inspectors general, who have jurisdiction only over the programs and operations of their respective departments or agencies, SIGAR has jurisdiction over all programs and operations supported with U.S. reconstruction dollars over the last 20 years, regardless of the agency involved. Because SIGAR has the authority to look across the entire $145 billion reconstruction effort, it is uniquely positioned to identify and address whole-of-government lessons..."
Afghanistan reconstruction 

Afghanistan: Background and U.S. Policy: In Brief

"Afghanistan emerged as a significant U.S. foreign policy concern in 2001, when the United States, in response to the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, led a military campaign against Al Qaeda and the Afghan Taliban government that harbored and supported it. In the intervening 19 years, the United States has suffered over 22,000 military casualties (including around 2,400 fatalities) in Afghanistan and Congress has appropriated approximately $143 billion for reconstruction and security forces there. In that time, an elected Afghan government has replaced the Taliban; improvement in most measures of human development is limited; and future prospects of gains remain mixed.

In January 2021, the Trump Administration reported that it had reduced U.S. forces in Afghanistan to 2,500, the lowest level since 2001, in advance of the potential full military withdrawal by May 2021 to which the United States committed in the February 2020 U.S.-Taliban agreement. As part of that agreement, in return for the full withdrawal of international forces, the Taliban committed to preventing other groups, including Al Qaeda, from using Afghan soil to recruit, train, or fund raise toward activities that threaten the United States or its allies. The agreement is accompanied by text which, according to Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Mark Milley, contains additional Taliban commitments, including to not attack U.S. or international forces. U.S. officials contend that the Taliban have not fulfilled their commitments, and describe the prospective U.S. withdrawal as “conditions-based,” but have not specified exactly what conditions might halt, reverse, or otherwise alter the withdrawal timeline laid out in the agreement.

Afghan government representatives were not participants in U.S.-Taliban talks, leading some observers to conclude that the United States would prioritize a military withdrawal over a complex political settlement that preserves some of the social, political, and humanitarian gains made since 2001. After months of delays, on September 12, 2020, Afghan government and Taliban representatives officially met in Doha, Qatar, to begin their first direct peace negotiations toward such a settlement, a significant moment with potentially dramatic implications for the course of the ongoing Afghan conflict. Talks do not appear to have made progress and remain complicated by a number of factors, including high levels of violence..."
Afghanistan 

Afghanistan: Post-Taliban Governance, Security, and U.S. Policy

"The United States, partner countries, and the Afghan government are attempting to reverse recent gains made by the resilient Taliban-led insurgency since the December 2014 transition to a smaller international mission consisting primarily of training and advising the Afghanistan National Defense and Security Forces (ANDSF). The Afghan government has come under increasing domestic criticism not only for failing to prevent insurgent gains but also for its internal divisions. In September 2014, the United States brokered a compromise to address a dispute over the 2014 presidential election, but a September 2016 deadline was not met for enacting election reforms and deciding whether to elevate the Chief Executive Officer (CEO) position to a prime ministership. The progress of the Afghan government in reducing corruption and implementing its budgetary and other commitments was assessed by an international meeting on Afghanistan during October 4-5, in Brussels, as sufficient to merit continued international assistance. The government has adopted measures that would enable it to proceed with new parliamentary elections, but no election date has been set..."
Afghanistan

Department of Defense Contractor and Troop Levels in Iraq and Afghanistan: 2007-2016

"This report provides background information for Congress on the levels of Department of Defense (DOD) troop and contractor personnel deployed in support of prior and ongoing military operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. For more information on DOD’s use of contractor personnel to support military operations, see CRS Report R43074, Department of Defense’s Use of Contractors to Support Military Operations: Background, Analysis, and Issues for Congress, by Moshe Schwartz.

The Role of Contractors in Military Operations

Throughout its history, DOD has relied on contractors to support a wide range of military operations. Operations over the past 30 years have highlighted the critical role that contractors play in supporting U.S. troops—both in terms of the number of contractors and the type of work being performed. During recent U.S. military operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, contractors frequently averaged 50% or more of the total DOD presence in-country..."
Afghanistan troop levels

A Guide to U.S. Military Casualty Statistics: Operation Freedom’s Sentinel, Operation Inherent Resolve, Operation New Dawn, Operation Iraqi Freedom, and Operation Enduring Freedom

"This report presents statistics regarding U.S. military and civilian casualties in the active missions Operation Freedom’s Sentinel (OFS, Afghanistan) and Operation Inherent Resolve (OIR, Iraq and Syria) and, as well as operations that have ended, Operation New Dawn (OND, Iraq), Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF, Iraq), and Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF, Afghanistan). It also includes statistics on post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD), traumatic brain injury (TBI), and amputations. Some of these statistics are publicly available at the Department of Defense’s (DOD’s) website and others have been obtained through DOD experts.
For more information on pre-2000 casualties, see CRS Report RL32492, American War and Military Operations Casualties: Lists and Statistics, by Nese F. DeBruyne and Anne Leland..."
military casualties

The Cost of Iraq, Afghanistan, and Other Global War on Terror Operations Since 9/11

"With enactment of the FY2014 Consolidated Appropriations Act on January 1, 2014 (H.R.
3547/P.L. 113-73), Congress has approved appropriations for the past 13 years of war that total $1.6 trillion for military operations, base support, weapons maintenance, training of Afghan and Iraq security forces, reconstruction, foreign aid, embassy costs, and veterans’ health care for the war operations initiated since the 9/11 attacks.

Of this $1.6 trillion total, CRS estimates that the total is distributed as follows:
• $686 billion (43%) for Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) for Afghanistan and
other counterterror operations received;
• $815 billion (51%) for Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF)/Operation New Dawn
(OND);
• $27 billion (2%) for Operation Noble Eagle (ONE), providing enhanced security
at military bases; and
• $81 billion (5%) for war-designated funding not considered directly related to the
Afghanistan or Iraq wars.,,: 
Cost of Iraq, Afghanistan and other wars

Afghanistan: Drug Trafficking and the 2014 Transition

"Afghanistan is the world’s primary source of opium poppy cultivation and opium and heroin

production, as well as a major global source of cannabis (marijuana) and cannabis resin (hashish).

Drug trafficking, a long-standing feature of Afghanistan’s post-Taliban political economy, is

linked to corruption and insecurity, and provides a source of illicit finance for non-state armed

groups. Based on recent production and trafficking trends, the drug problem in Afghanistan

appears to be worsening—just as the U.S. government finalizes plans for its future relationship

with the government of Afghanistan in 2015 and beyond and reduces its counternarcotics

operational presence in the country to Kabul, the national capital.."Afghanistan & Drug Trafficking

Understanding War in Afghanistan

"Understanding War in Afghanistan has been converted to an e-book format. This new format makes the book readable not only on desktop and laptop computers, but also on Apple's iPad, Sony's Reader, the Barnes & Noble Nook, and Android-based phones.

Download the file to your computer and then drag and drop onto your reading device.
+ .mobi | + .pdf | + .epub
Also available in the following e-books stores.
Google Books
Amazon Kindle Store.."

Report on Progress Toward Security and Stablity in Afghanistan

"Since initial publication in June 2008, the Report on Progress Toward Security and Stability in Afghanistan has provided the U.S. Congress semi-annual assessments on developments in Afghanistan and the state of the international coalition’s civil-military campaign. The June 2008 report presented a bleak assessment of the situation in Afghanistan: “The Taliban regrouped after its fall from power and have coalesced into a resilient insurgency.” A year later the situation had declined further; as noted in the June 2009 report: “The security situation continued to deteriorate in much of Afghanistan.” However, these trends gradually began to change as shifts in strategy were supported by critical resources, and in November 2010, the report for the first time highlighted “modest gains in security, governance, and development in operational priority areas,” noting as well their uneven and fragile character. The last three iterations reported that progress has continued to expand, with the most recent report in October 2011 highlighting “important security gains” and “reversal of violence trends in much of the country.”.."

Afghanistan: Politics, Elections, and Government Performance

"Building capacity and limiting corruption at all levels of Afghan governance are crucial to the success of a planned transition from U.S.-led NATO forces to Afghan security leadership.

• The capacity of the formal Afghan governing structure has increased significantly
since the Taliban regime fell in late 2001, but many positions at the local level
are unfilled.
• Nepotism and political considerations in hiring are entrenched in Afghan culture
and limit development of a competent bureaucracy, as does widespread illiteracy.

• President Hamid Karzai has accepted U.S. help to build emerging anti-corruption
institutions, but these same institutions have sometimes caused a Karzai backlash
when they have targeted his allies or relatives..."

Afghanistan Casualties: Military Forces and Civilians

"This report collects statistics from a variety of sources on casualties sustained during Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF), which began on October 7, 2001, and is ongoing. OEF actions take place primarily in Afghanistan; however, OEF casualties also includes American casualties in Pakistan, Uzbekistan, Guantanamo Bay (Cuba), Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Jordan, Kenya,Kyrgyzstan, the Philippines, Seychelles, Sudan, Tajikistan, Turkey, and Yemen.

Casualty data of U.S. military forces are compiled by the U.S. Department of Defense (DOD), as tallied from the agency’s press releases. Also included are statistics on those wounded but not killed. Statistics may be revised as circumstances are investigated and as records are processed through the U.S. military’s casualty system. More frequent updates are available at DOD’s website at http://www.defenselink.mil/news/ under “Casualty Update..."

Afghanistan: Politics, Elections, and Government Performance

"The limited capacity and widespread corruption of all levels of Afghan governance are factors in
congressional debate over the effectiveness of U.S. policy in Afghanistan and in implementing a
transition to Afghan security leadership. That transition is to be completed by the end of 2014, a
timeframe agreed to by the United States, its international partners, and the Afghan government.
While trusting only his closest allies, most of whom are ethnic Pashtuns, Karzai has tried to
satisfy leaders of other ethnic and political faction leaders. However, some of these faction
leaders oppose Karzai on the grounds that he is too willing to make concessions to insurgent
leaders in search of a settlement, and that he has tried to use his office to manipulate Afghan
institutions and election results to the advantage of him and his faction. A dispute over the results of the 2010 parliamentary elections paralyzed governance for nearly a year, but appears to have been resolved in August 2011 with Karzai’s suspension of a special court that sought to remove the declared winners of nearly a quarter of the seats of the elected lower house of parliament. Karzai also has tried, through direct denials, to quell assertions by his critics that he wants to stay in office beyond the 2014 expiration of his second term, the limits under the constitution..."

Afghanistan: U.S. Rule of Law and Justice Sector Assistance
"Developing effective Afghan justice sector institutions is considered by many observers to be
essential in winning the support of the Afghan population, improving the Afghan government’s
credibility and legitimacy, and reducing support for insurgent factions. Such sentiments are
reinforced in the face of growing awareness of the pervasiveness of Afghan corruption. To this
end, establishing the rule of law (ROL) in Afghanistan has become a priority in U.S. strategy for
Afghanistan and an issue of interest to Congress. Numerous U.S. programs to promote ROL are
in various stages of implementation and receive ongoing funding and oversight from Congress.
Major programs include the following:

• State Department’s Justice Sector Support Program (JSSP) and Corrections
System Support Program (CSSP);

• U.S. Agency for International Development’s (USAID’s) formal and informal
ROL stabilization programs (RLS);

• Justice Department’s (DOJ’s) Senior Federal Prosecutors Program, which, with
State Department funds, provides legal mentoring and training; and

• Defense Department’s (DOD’s) operational support through Combined Joint
Task Force 101 (CJTF-101), as well as through Combined Joint Interagency Task
Force 435 (CJIATF-435)..."

Afghanistan: U.S. Rule of Law and Justice Sector Assistance
"Developing effective Afghan justice sector institutions is considered by many observers to be
essential in winning the support of the Afghan population, improving the Afghan government’s
credibility and legitimacy, and reducing support for insurgent factions. Such sentiments are
reinforced in the face of growing awareness of the pervasiveness of Afghan corruption. To this
end, establishing the rule of law (ROL) in Afghanistan has become a priority in U.S. strategy for
Afghanistan and an issue of interest to Congress. Numerous U.S. programs to promote ROL are
in various stages of implementation and receive ongoing funding and oversight from Congress.
Major programs include the following:

• State Department’s Justice Sector Support Program (JSSP) and Corrections
System Support Program (CSSP);
• U.S. Agency for International Development’s (USAID’s) formal and informal
ROL stabilization programs (RLS);
• Justice Department’s (DOJ’s) Senior Federal Prosecutors Program, which, with
State Department funds, provides legal mentoring and training; and
• Defense Department’s (DOD’s) operational support through Combined Joint
Task Force 101 (CJTF-101), as well as through Combined Joint Interagency Task
Force 435 (CJIATF-435)..."

Afghanistan: Politics, Elections, and Government Performance
"The weak performance and lack of transparency within the Afghan government are a growing
factor in debate over the effectiveness of U.S. strategy in Afghanistan. In a December 1, 2009,
policy statement on Afghanistan, which followed the second of two major Afghanistan strategy
reviews in 2009, President Obama stated that “The days of providing a blank check [to the
Afghan government] are over.” Since early 2010, the Administration has been pressing President
Hamid Karzai to move more decisively to address corruption within his government, but Karzai’s
backlash against the criticism has caused the Administration to try to work quietly with Karzai
and to emphasize building the capacity of several emerging anti-corruption institutions. However,
these same institutions have sometimes targeted Karzai allies and undermined the U.S.-Karzai
partnership, compelling Karzai to strengthen his bond to ethnic and political faction leaders who
are often involved in illicit economic activity and who undermine rule of law. Some of the effects
of corruption burst into public view in August 2010 when major losses were announced by the
large Kabul Bank, in part due to large loans to major shareholders, many of whom are close to
Karzai. While prodding Karzai on corruption—including some moves in Congress to link further
U.S. aid to clear progress on this issue—another clear trend over the past two years has been to
reduce sole reliance on the Afghan central government by strengthening local governing bodies.
This is being implemented, in part, by expanding the presence of U.S. government civilians as
advisors outside Kabul..."

Afghanistan: U.S. Foreign Assistance
"The U.S. program of assistance to Afghanistan is intended to stabilize and strengthen the Afghan
economic, social, political, and security environment so as to blunt popular support for extremist
forces in the region. Since 2001, nearly $48 billion has been appropriated toward this effort.

More than half of U.S. assistance—roughly 57%—has gone to the training and equipping of
Afghan forces. The remainder has gone to development and humanitarian-related activities from
infrastructure to private sector support, governance and democratization efforts, and counternarcotics programs.

Key U.S. agencies providing aid are the Department of Defense, the Agency for International
Development, and the Department of State..."

Afghanistan Casualties: Military Forces and Civilians
"This report collects statistics from a variety of sources on casualties sustained during Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF), which began on October 7, 2001, and is ongoing. OEF actions take place primarily in Afghanistan; however, OEF casualties also includes American casualties in Pakistan, Uzbekistan, Guantanamo Bay (Cuba), Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Jordan, Kenya, Kyrgyzstan, the Philippines, Seychelles, Sudan, Tajikistan, Turkey, and Yemen.

Casualty data of U.S. military forces are compiled by the U.S. Department of Defense (DOD), as tallied from the agency’s press releases. Also included are statistics on those wounded but not killed. Statistics may be revised as circumstances are investigated and as records are processed through the U.S. military’s casualty system. More frequent updates are available at DOD’s website at http://www.defenselink.mil/news/ under “Casualty Update.”

A detailed casualty summary of U.S. military forces that includes data on deaths by cause, as well as statistics on soldiers wounded in action, is available at the following DOD website:http://siadapp.dmdc.osd.mil/personnel/CASUALTY/castop.htm..."