Tracking COVID-19: U.S. Public Health Surveillance and Data

"Public health surveillance, or ongoing data collection, is an essential part of public health practice. Particularly during a pandemic, timely data are important to understanding the epidemiology of a disease in order to craft policy and guide response decisionmaking. Many aspects of public health surveillance—such as which data are collectedand how—are often governed by law and policy at the state and subfederallevel, though informed by programs and expertise at the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC).

The Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19) pandemic has exposed limitations and challenges with U.S. public health surveillance, including those related to the timeliness, completeness, and accuracy of data. This report provides an overview of U.S. public health surveillance, current COVID-19 surveillance and data collection, and selected policy issues that have been highlighted by the pandemic. Appendix B includes a compilation of selected COVID-19 data resources.

Current COVID-19 Surveillance and Data Collection
 

CDC’s COVID-19 surveillance involves numeroussurveillance systems that collect a variety of data, including on cases, testing positivity rates, hospitalizations, deaths, and emergency department visits. The multiple systems reflect an effort by CDC to strike a balance in surveillance—collecting different data types, with different measurement-related strengths and weaknesses that together can provide a picture of how the pandemic is affecting different populations in different locations. Other components of the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) and other agencies also collect data to inform emergency response. 

Congress has taken severalrelated actions, including

 enacting a new authority in the CARES Act (P.L. 116-136, §18115) authorizing the HHS Secretary to impose data reporting requirements on clinical laboratories during the public health emergency;
 
 appropriating funding for grants to jurisdictions and tribal entities that can be used for surveillance;

 appropriating $500 million in the CARES Act (P.L. 116-136) for public health data modernization; and

 enacting several provisionsin the Paycheck Protection Program and Health Care Enhancement Act (PPPHCEA; P.L. 116-139) requiring regular reports on COVID-19 data and epidemiology submitted from CDC to Congress..."
Tracking COVID-19 and public health 

Surveillance of Foreigners Outside the United States Under Section 702 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA)

"After the attacks of September 11, 2001, President George W. Bush authorized the National Security Agency to conduct a Terrorist Surveillance Program (TSP) to “intercept international communications into and out of the United States” by “persons linked to al Qaeda or related terrorist organizations.” After the TSP activities were concluded in 2007, Congress enacted the Protect America Act (PAA, P.L. 110-55), which established a mechanism for the acquisition, via a joint certification by the Director of National Intelligence (DNI) and the Attorney General (AG), but without an individualized court order, of foreign intelligence information concerning a person reasonably believed to be outside the United States. This temporary authority ultimately expired after approximately six months, on February 16, 2008. Several months later, Congress enacted the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) Amendments Act of 2008 (P.L. 110-261), which created separate procedures for targeting non-U.S. persons and U.S. persons reasonably believed to be outside the United States under a new Title VII of FISA. Title VII of FISA was reauthorized in late 2012 (P.L. 112-238); this authority now sunsets on December 31, 2017..."
Foreigner Surveillance

Drones in Domestic Surveillance Operations: Fourth Amendment Implications and Legislative Responses

"This report assesses the use of drones under the Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures. The touchstone of the Fourth Amendment is reasonableness. A reviewing court’s determination of the reasonableness of drone surveillance would likely be informed by location of the search, the sophistication of the technology used, and society’s conception of privacy in an age of rapid technological advancement. While individuals can expect substantial protections against warrantless government intrusions into their homes, the Fourth Amendment offers less robust restrictions upon government surveillance occurring in public places and perhaps even less in areas immediately outside the home, such as in driveways or backyards. Concomitantly, as technology advances, the contours of what is reasonable under the Fourth Amendment may adjust as people’s expectations of privacy evolve..."

Satellite Surveillance: Domestic Issues
"...This report provides background on the development of intelligence satellites and identifies the roles various agencies play in their management and use. Issues surrounding the current policy and proposed changes are discussed, including the findings of an Independent Study Group (ISG) with respect to the increased sharing of satellite intelligence data. There follows a discussion of legal considerations, including whether satellite reconnaissance might constitute a “search” within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment; an overview of statutory authorities, as well as
restrictions that might apply; and a brief description of executive branch authorities and Department of Defense directives that might apply. The report concludes by discussing policy issues Congress may consider as it deliberates the potential advantages and pitfalls that may be encountered in expanding the role of satellite intelligence for homeland security purposes."